Wreck Raising Gorz Joseph

UNSinkable "NATI"

UNSinkable "NATI"

During the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea in November 1944, mines, torpedoes, bombs and artillery fire sank many Japanese ships. Some of them lay at a relatively shallow depth accessible to divers, and the command of the US Navy decided to search these ships for secret documents and other information regarding Japan's military plans. This task was entrusted to the divers and crew of the Chauntecleer, a submarine rescue vessel. One of the ships from which the implementation of the planned operation began was a Japanese light cruiser, lying at a depth of 30 m with a slight roll to starboard.

The first to go under the water was diving foreman Joseph Karneke. Going down to the deck of the ship, he proceeded to inspect it and soon saw the gun, which still had his dead crew. People froze in those positions in which they found the explosion of a bomb or shell. Death was instant.

In the chart room, Carneke found an unusually large number of maps and papers. He collected them all and brought them to the surface. The documents were of great interest to the intelligence representative who was on the salvage ship; divers were ordered to thoroughly search all the premises of the sunken cruiser and take away all documents, including personal ones.

Papers delivered to Carneke revealed that he had found the mythical Nachi, the flagship of Vice Admiral Kyoshide Shima, a ship the Japanese boasted was unsinkable. And, indeed, until his last battle, Nati managed to withstand hits from 225-kilogram bombs, as well as torpedoes, missiles and shells. However, on May 5, 1944, he was intercepted while trying to break out of Manila Bay and took the hit of 9 torpedoes, 13 bombs of 450 kg and 6 of 110 kg, as well as 16 missiles. This was finally enough, and the cruiser went to the bottom.

Carneke discovered that each compartment of the ship was absolutely watertight: it did not communicate with neighboring compartments either through hatches or doors, so damage to any compartment did not entail flooding of other rooms. Thick steel armor covered both the deck and the hull plating.

The divers worked in pairs, with one of them entering the still unexamined room, the other watching its hoses and line. Once, during the work of such a pair, when one diver was raking books and documents into a bag, the other briefly stopped watching his comrade and, having passed along the corridor, wandered into the next room in search of souvenirs. As soon as he entered, the door, slamming shut under its own weight as a result of the roll of the ship, severed the cable through which electric power was supplied from the surface for underwater lamps. Caught in complete darkness, the diver lost his head and, forgetting that he could easily find his way back along the rescue line, began to scream in despair. His ward had to come to his aid. Since then, the hunt for souvenirs on the Nati has ceased.

“There is hardly anything else that disciplines a diver so well,” Carneke remarked, “as the cry he heard underwater.

Once, Carneke himself cut a hole in partition bulkhead. The explosion of the unburned part of the gas mixture that had accumulated at the ceiling of the compartment knocked him off his feet, and the earpiece of the phone, torn from its socket, hit his temple hard. Carneke got up and, still not quite recovering himself, stuck his foot into the hole he had cut. At the same moment, he felt a death grip on his boot. I had to call for help from the second diver Krassica, who took a good 20 minutes to free his comrade's leg. Carneke went to the surface, and Crassike stayed behind, trying to discover the unknown monster that had so treacherously attacked his colleague. A few minutes later, he happily announced on the phone:

“Tell Karneka that his foot is stuck in a Japanese toilet.”

The divers eventually found the ship's safe and blew it open with a putty-like substance known as Composition C, which is twice as explosive as TNT. A diver named Posey was sent down to examine the contents of the safe. When he reached him, he reported that the safe was full of money. Posey was ordered to return immediately, to which he replied that he was entangled in cables and hose, but in a few minutes he hoped to free himself. Finally, he appeared on the surface and climbed onto the deck of the rescue vessel. Banknotes stuck out from behind his belt, cuffs, in a word, from any place suitable for this. Only when the helmet was removed from him, he was able to see how precariously he hid his treasure.

“Lord,” he wondered, “how did all this stick to me?

Anyway, he did not lose much, since the money turned out to be Japanese banknotes in denominations of 10 yen: money was transported on the Nachi to pay maintenance to Japanese sailors. Intelligence officials were very happy to find 2 million yen, since the Japanese currency needed for some covert operations has always been difficult to get. But even more delighted were their documents found by divers. Among these papers, as a naval intelligence officer later told the divers, were plans for military operations against the Allies, information about the Japanese defenses and their preparatory measures in case of an Allied landing. It is rare, if ever, that so much important military information has been found in one place.

Assembled and photographed a model of the heavy cruiser Nachi. Myoko-class cruiser. The model is manufactured by Aoshima.
Collected for four months, finished in March 2011.
Launched in 1927 at the shipyard in Kure, completed in 1928. Before the war, it was modernized in 1935. During the Second World War, it was repeatedly modernized. Model shown as of May 1943. Actively participated in the naval war in the Pacific. Died 11/05/1944 from air attacks breaking into three parts in the area of ​​Manila Bay.
Used literature: Two Tamiya books "Random japanese warship details", "Japanese heavy cruisers" by S. Suligi, Japanese book "Heavy cruisers of the Mioko type" (a very good book, but in Japanese), Polish Naval Profiles, according to Mioko and a separate one Naty, I found something on the Internet.
Used, except for the model itself:
- Etching Aoshima for Nachi, I also bought a lifeline for the Mioko class, but I didn’t like them, I didn’t use them.
- Etching from GMM (handrail and handrail with tarpaulin)
- Toms Modelworks (type 21 radar for cruisers, hatches, etc. from the set for heavy cruisers, sets of upper deck elements for Kriegsmarine ships and for Japan)
- Hasegawa (three sets) - a set for warships, a set for naval aircraft, a set for anti-aircraft guns and optical instruments (ladders, views, hatches, bow chrysanthemum, parts for boats, anti-aircraft guns, etc.)
- Ka -models- handrails, doors, degaussing cable, ladders, stands for the model.
- Allians Modelworks - davits, ladders.
- Fly Hawk - a set for boats and boats of Japanese ships, davits, main battery turrets for heavy cruisers, ammunition boxes, perforated "strings" on the deck.
- Lion Roar - doors, turntables and rails for seaplanes.
- Rainbow - handrails for pipes.
- Voyager - life buoys and their "baskets", 11 m boat, binoculars.
- WEM - handrails, doors.
- Model master - Gk and 25mm barrels.
- Nico models - resin 127mm anti-aircraft guns with shields (I did not like the shields, I used slightly modified shields from the model)
- L Arsenal - figures (two different sets)
- Fujimi - figures (two different sets)
- Veteran models - binoculars (many and different), paravanes, deck winch (which is .. apparently a winch), but it looks great with a "wash"
- Fine Molds - top lamps (probably that's what they are called in Russian), spotlights, binoculars.
-Goffi models - figures of sailors
Paints and primer: GSI, Tamiya
Varnish Microscale and Kristal Clear for "glazing", Set and Sol for decals.
The model thread is Belarusian. Decals "Behemoth".
The model itself is simple and I wanted to "complicate" it as much as possible (as far as patience is enough). Well, the list of used "good" roughly shows what I did for 4 months. I myself made "bindings" on the fore mast from wire, I made yards from two 0.5 mm drills (the plastic is too fragile), the flag and guis rods are also drills, screwed and glued. The cable from the rangefinder post to the bow superstructure is a brass tube 0.2mm (Lyon Roar). For the longest time I glued the "strips" on the deck. I tried in one area for "naked" plastic, in another for "primed", in the third for painted. I did not come to definite conclusions ..., in total, one and a half sets went on the ship.
I really liked Fine molds products, everything is made of plastic, but thin and neat like resin.
The wash was done with Tamiyevka enamel Smoke.
Sailors of three firms from five different sets L arsenal, Goffey models, Fujimi, the first white, the second blue and Fujimi grey. I painted it myself, if you noticed, then they are of two types - officers and sailors. I glued signal flags from Edward to the signalman.
This is my third model. Thanks for the advice to more experienced colleagues
Now special large etching kits for the Myoko class have appeared, but at the moment everything that I could pick up and do myself ..
I know my performance and historical shortcomings myself, I will try to improve the quality of work in the following models ..

"Nachi" (Japanese 那智, after the name of the mountain in Wakayama Prefecture) is a Japanese heavy cruiser, the second laid down and the first representative of the Myoko class that entered service. Built in Kure in 1924 - 1928.

It was actively used in the interwar period, in 1934 - 1935 and 1939 - 1940 it underwent two major upgrades.

During the fighting in the Pacific theater of World War II in the first half of 1942, as part of the 5th cruiser division, he participated in the capture of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies.
In the battle in the Java Sea on February 27, 1942, he was the flagship of Admiral Takagi, sank the Dutch cruiser Java with torpedoes.

Participated in the Second Battle of the Java Sea on March 1. Since the spring of 1942, she was the flagship of the Fifth Fleet, in this capacity she participated in the Aleutian operation, escorting convoys to Attu and Kyska, battles near the Commander Islands and in Leyte Gulf.
On November 5, 1944, Nati was sunk in Manila Bay by carrier-based aircraft from the American aircraft carriers Lexington and Ticonderoga.

Building

An order for the construction of the first pair of 10,000-ton cruisers worth 21.9 million yen was issued in the spring of 1923. On December 11, 1923, cruiser No. 6 (the second of the pair) was named Nachi, after a mountain in the southeast of Wakayama Prefecture. This name was used in YaIF for the first time, although earlier it was among the 8000-ton ships of the 8-8 program reserved for naming.

On November 26, 1924, his corps was laid down on slipway No. 3 of the Naval Arsenal in Kure. Nachi was built faster than the lead Myoko. Its launch was already scheduled for October 15, 1926, however, due to the collapse of two overloaded gantry cranes on December 24, 1925, the bow of the cruiser's hull was seriously damaged, which delayed its departure from the slipway for eight months.

Nachi was launched on June 15, 1927 in the presence of Prince Morimasa Nashimoto and 35,000 spectators. A political decision was made to put it into operation as quickly as possible in order to be in time for the naval review scheduled for December 4, 1928, timed to coincide with the coronation of Emperor Hirohito.
On sea trials on October 22, 1928 near the island of Ugurudzima with a displacement of 12,200 tons and a machine power of 131,481 hp. he developed 35,531 knots, which slightly exceeded the contractual 35.5. November 20 of the same year, "Nati" was accepted by the fleet, without, however, most of the fire control devices, catapults and shields of 120-mm guns.

Service History

pre-war

After entering service, Nachi participated in the naval parade in honor of the coronation of Emperor Hirohito on December 4, 1928. Then he was returned to the shipyard for refitting, where he remained until April 1929.

On May 28-29, 1929, Hirohito aboard the Nachi made an inspection tour of enterprises in the cities of the Kansai region. In November, all four Myoko-class ships were assigned to the 4th Cruiser Division of the Second Fleet.

From May 17 to June 19, 1930, Nati, along with the rest of the units included in the formation, sailed to the southern seas to test the operation of systems in a tropical climate.
On November 26, they all took part in the maritime review in Yokosuka. At the end of the year, the first chimney on the cruiser was lengthened by 2 m to reduce the gas contamination of the bridge, and rain caps were installed on both pipes.

From March 29 until the end of April 1931, the 4th division, together with Furutaka and Aoba, operated in the Qingdao region, in August and September it participated in the exercises.
In November, work began on the cruiser to replace the main guns with the new Type 3 No. 2, convert the magazines and lifts for heavier ammunition, and improve ventilation.
On August 4, 1932, during the annual maneuvers of the Nachi fleet, together with Myoko, he participated in firing new Type 91 armor-piercing shells at the Haikan No. 4 target ship (the former Aso mine layer, until 1905 - the Russian armored cruiser " Bayan"), then sunk by submarine torpedoes.

On August 16-21, 1933, Nachi, together with ships of the same type (now part of the 5th cruiser division), made another voyage to the southern seas, and on the 21st participated in Yokohama.
On December 11, on the eve of the start of the first major modernization, he, along with the Myoko, was transferred to the Kure District Guard Division, and on February 1, 1934, to a similar formation that covered the Sasebo area.

The first stage of work on the Nati was completed from February to June 1935, during which old anti-aircraft guns, fixed torpedo tubes and a catapult with an aircraft hangar were dismantled (new ones were installed instead: respectively 4 × 2 127-mm / 40 Type 89, 2 × 4 TA Type 92 Model 1, 2 × Type No. 2 Model 3), the first tier of the superstructure was extended to the 4th tower of the Civil Code (forming a new deck - anti-aircraft), the old anti-torpedo boules were replaced with enlarged ones, instead of unreliable cruising electric motors, they installed induction turbines, on the middle deck placed additional space for the increased crew.
After leaving the repair and until July 10, the cruiser played the role of a training artillery ship. Then, from mid-July until October 2, he participated in the annual maneuvers, passing on September 26, along with other units of the Fourth Fleet, through the center of the typhoon. In October, the Nati, along with the rest of the ships of the same type, went through the second stage of modernization work, receiving new searchlights and two quadruple 13.2-mm machine guns, while Type 91 directors and Lewis machine guns also moved.
The third stage was held there in January-March 1936 following the results of investigations into incidents with the Fourth Fleet and the explosion in the turret of the cruiser Ashigara: the weak points of the hull were strengthened with 25-mm plates, and the system for blowing out main gun barrels after firing was improved. In April, the 5th division conducted firing exercises in the Yellow Sea.
Finally, from May 25 to June 29, Nachi, together with Myoko and Haguro, went through the fourth stage of work in Sasebo, during which a more powerful cargo boom drive was installed on the mainmast, and its supports were strengthened. In August-September, the cruiser participated in the annual fleet maneuvers, making a trip to the Taiwan area.

On March 27–April 6, 1937, Nachi, together with Myoko and Haguro, made a short trip to the Qingdao region and back. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, all four cruisers of the Myoko and Maya classes and the 2nd destroyer squadron were transported to Shanghai by the 3rd Infantry Division of the JIA on August 20-23.
In September and November, the Nachi, together with the Haguro, made several more trips to the coast of Northern China, and after that, on December 1, it was put into reserve.

The second major modernization of the cruiser took place between January 1939 and March 1940 in Sasebo. It consisted in installing a second pair of torpedo tubes, four Type 96 twin anti-aircraft guns and two Type 93 twin machine guns (quadruple ones were removed), catapults were replaced with new Type No. 2 Model 5, boules were replaced with improved ones, fire control devices were installed the same as previously on "Ashigara". A central communication post, an encryption room and a centralized control post for flooding and drainage of compartments were also equipped.

On February 17–March 12, 1941, the Nachi, together with the Haguro, made a trip from Sasebo to the coast of South China and back. After docking on March 13-20, he moved to the Palau Islands on March 29-April 8, and returned back on March 12-26. In May, a degaussing winding of the hull and a torpedo fire control post on the foremast were installed on the cruiser - as on the last Myoko that underwent the second modernization.

The Nachi spent the summer of 1941 doing combat training off its coast, and in early September it was docked at Sasebo. On November 23, the cruiser left Kure with full stocks of ammunition, fuel and supplies, and entering Sasebo and Mako along the way, arrived on the Palau Islands on December 6.

During the Second World War

After the start of the war, Nachi, along with Myoko and Haguro, took part in Operation M (the capture of the southern part of the Philippines).
December 11, he covered the landing at Legaspi, 19-20 - at Davao, 24 - on the island of Jolo. On January 4, 1942, due to damage during the bombing of the flagship of the 5th division, the Myoko, its commander, Admiral Takagi, transferred his flag to the Nachi.

On January 9, the cruiser, together with the Haguro, left Davao to participate in Operation H (the capture of Sulawesi), during which it initially escorted transports, and then covered the landings of troops - on the 11th at Manado and Kema, on the 24th at Kendari. On the 26th, it was attacked by the American submarine Sailfish, which fired four Mk 14 torpedoes at it. Although its commander, Captain 3rd Rank Vogue, claimed to have heard explosions and the sound of propellers stopping, Nachi and Haguro did not suffer any damage. received.

On January 30, the cruiser covered the landing on Ambon, and on February 9 - in Makassar. Standing from 10 to 17 February in Staring Bay, on the 20th he supported the capture of Dili and Kupang on Timor.

On February 27, the flagship of the Takagi Nachi, along with the Haguro and the 2nd destroyer squadron, took part in the battle with the ABDA fleet (2 heavy and 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers), known as the Battle of the Java Sea.
In its daytime phase, it engaged in artillery combat with Allied ships at a range of 20-25 km, firing 845 203-mm shells, without achieving noticeable success (the only successful hit in the Exeter's boiler room belonged to the Haguro) and without receiving any damage myself.
In the evening, Nati, firing a total of 16 Type 93 oxygen torpedoes, sank the Dutch cruiser Java with one of them. This hit was one of three successful on all 153 launches from Japanese ships - the De Ruyter was sunk by the other two from the Haguro.

On March 1, 1942, Nati took part in finishing off the remnants of the ABDA fleet (Exeter with two destroyers), known as the second battle in the Java Sea.
Due to the high consumption of ammunition in the previous battle, its contribution, like the Haguro, was rather limited - 170 fired 203-mm shells and 4 torpedoes, the Myoko and Ashigara with destroyers played the main role.

On March 2-17, the Nachi moved to Sasebo (with calls to Kendari and Makassar), where it was expelled from the 5th division, and until April 7, repairs were carried out there with docking.
At the same time, it was converted into a flagship for operations in northern waters, and after a trip on April 7-25 to the shores of Hokkaido on the 29th, Vice Admiral Hosogaya, commander of the Fifth Fleet, raised his flag on it. On May 3, the cruiser moved to Akkesi and left on the 6th, heading for the Kuriles.
However, on 10-12, together with Tama, he towed the Syria tanker with a damaged rudder on the return route. May 12-15 "Nachi" moved to Ominato, where he began to repair.

On June 2, the cruiser arrived at Paramushir, and after refueling from the Nissan Maru tanker, on June 3, she went to sea to participate in Operation AL. Until returning to Ominato on the 23rd, he covered the landing of troops on Attu by patrolling the ocean south of the island. June 28-July 14 "Nati" made a second trip to the area, then from 24 to 30 passed docking in Yokosuka.
On July 14, she was transferred to the 21st cruiser division (Tama and Kiso), while remaining the flagship of the Fifth Fleet. On August 2, the Nachi left Yokosuka and until the twentieth of March 1943 cruised along the Paramushir-Ominato route.
On September 20, 1942, due to an erroneous report about the appearance of American ships, he advanced to intercept them; in February, he underwent repairs in Sasebo (with the installation of windshields).

March 26, 1943 "Nati" as part of the Northern connection participated in the battle near the Commander Islands. During it, he fired 707 203-mm shells and 16 Type 93 torpedoes, causing damage to the cruiser Salt Lake City and the destroyer Bailey, while receiving five hits from return fire. All of them were inflicted by the fire of 127-mm guns.
The first shell exploded at the rear of the compass bridge, breaking part of the electrical circuits of the fire control system, the second damaged one of the foremast supports, the third - the catapult and one of the seaplanes. The fourth shell hit the GK turret No. 1, jamming it, the fifth one hit the signal platform from the starboard side. The crew of the cruiser lost 14 people killed and 27 wounded during the battle.

April 3 "Nati" arrived in Yokosuka and was there for repairs, which lasted until May 11. In addition to repairing damage, a Type 21 airborne target detection radar and an additional 4 Type 96 twin anti-aircraft guns were installed on it, with the number of their barrels doubling - up to 16.

In May-June, the cruiser again cruised from Ominato to Paramushir and back. On July 10-15, he, along with Maya, went out to evacuate the garrison of Kiska Island, but they were forced to return due to weather conditions.
On August 5, the Northern Connection was disbanded, and the Fifth Fleet, together with Nati, became organizationally part of the fleet of the North-Eastern zone.

At the end of August, the Type 21 Model 3 universal radar was experimentally installed on the cruiser in Ominato. On September 6, when leaving the Nati port, it was attacked by the American submarine Khalibat, which fired 4 torpedoes at it, of which only one hit and did not explode , caused minor damage.
In September-November, the cruiser operated in northern waters. From December 9 to January 15, 1944, he underwent the second military modernization in Sasebo, during which 8 Type 96 single machine guns were installed (the number of barrels after that was 24) and a Type 22 surface target detection radar, an experimental Type 21 Model 3 was replaced with a conventional Type 21 Model 2.
In February-March, Nachi made trips to Tokuyama and Mutsu Bay, and from April 2 to August 2, together with Ashigara, it was part of the Ominato security area, with a break for repairs in Yokosuka in the twentieth of June.
Until October, the cruiser did not leave the Inland Sea, in the second half of September, the third military modernization took place in Kure, with the addition of 2 more twin and 20 single anti-aircraft guns (total number of barrels - 48) to the existing anti-aircraft guns, the installation of a Type 13 radar and the dismantling of the second pair of torpedo tubes , as well as upgrading the Type 22 radar to Type 22 Model 4S, designed for use in a fire control system.

On October 14-16, the 21st division (commander - Vice Admiral Sima) moved to the island of Amamioshima. On the 23rd, in preparation for Operation Sho Go, she arrived in Coron Bay in the Philippines and joined the Second Raid Force, the Nachi became its flagship.
On the night of the 24th, the ships went out to support Nishimura's battleships, but after their death in the Surigao Strait, they were forced to return. At the same time, early in the morning of the 25th, the Nati rammed the damaged Mogami, receiving a large hole on the starboard side near the first main main turret and a speed limit of 20 knots.

On October 27-28, together with Ashigara, he moved from Coron Bay to Manila and was docked at shipyard No. 103 in Cavite. On the 29th, the cruiser was raided by carrier-based aircraft of the American task force 38.2, having received an air bomb in the catapult area, 53 crew members were killed and wounded. On November 2, the repair was completed and the cruiser began to prepare for participation in Operation TA (posting military convoys to Ormoc on the island of Leyte).

On the morning of November 5, 1944, Nati in Manila Bay was attacked by carrier-based aircraft from the American aircraft carriers Lexington and Ticonderoga of Rear Admiral Sherman's task force 38.3.
During the first two raids, the cruiser did not receive any damage and went to the open sea, but at about 12:50 she underwent a third raid consisting of about 60 aircraft, receiving two or three torpedo and five bomb hits, and as a result of flooding the starboard boiler rooms she lost move.
By 14:00, the roll was leveled by counter-flooding, preparations were underway for launching cars or towing with the help of the destroyer Akebono.
At 14:45 "Nati" was subjected to the fourth raid, having received 5 torpedoes, 15 bombs and 16 missiles in a short period of time and was torn into three parts, the central one sank at 14:50 at a point with coordinates 14 ° 31′ s. sh. 120°44′ E d.

807 crew members were killed, including the commander of the cruiser Captain 1st Rank Kanooka and 74 members of the Fifth Fleet headquarters (Admiral Sima was on the shore at the time of the battle), about 220 were rescued by the destroyers Kasumi and Ushio, despite the active opposition of American aviation .

The fate of the shipwreck

In March-April 1945, divers from the American vessel Chauntecleer visited the site of the cruiser's death. They found the central and stern parts of the ship lying at a depth of 30 meters with a list of 45 ° to starboard; they could not find the previously torn off fore end.
During 296 dives, several radar antennas, maps of Japanese fortifications on Luzon, code books and banknotes worth two million yen were raised to the surface. After the completion of the work, the cruiser's masts were blown up so as not to interfere with traffic in the navigable fairway.

In the post-war period, rumors spread about gold allegedly on board the Nati. Around the 1970s, the remains of the cruiser were completely removed from the bottom as representing a navigational hazard; in 2000, Australian diver Kevin Denley, who conducted a detailed search for them, could no longer find anything.
He also found that their usually indicated position (west or southwest of the island of Corregidor) was in a diametrically opposite direction from the real one, known from documents from the Chanticleer - almost in the center of Manila Bay, on the main shipping channel.

Main characteristics:

Displacement standard / full Initially: 10,980/14,194 tons After modernization: 12,342/15,933 tons
Length 201.74 m (at the waterline); 203.76 m (largest, after modernization).
Width 19.0 m (largest initially); 20.73 m (after modernization).
Draft 6.23 m (original); 6.35 m (after modernization).
Reservation Source: Armor belt - 102 mm;
deck - 32-35 mm; PTP - 58 mm; towers - 25 mm;
Engines 4 TZA "Kampon", 12 boilers "Kampon Ro Go".
Power 130,000 liters. With. (95.6 MW).
Propulsion 4 propellers.
Travel speed 35.5 knots initially, 33.3 after modernization.
Cruising range 7000 nautical miles at 14 knots (effective, initially).
Crew 764 initially; up to 970 on "Myoko" and "Ashigara" after the second modernization.

Armament (Original)

Artillery 5 × 2 - 200mm/50 Type 3.
Anti-aircraft artillery 6 × 1 120 mm / 45 Type 10, 2 × 7.7 mm Lewis machine guns;
Mine-torpedo armament 12 (4 × 3) - 610 mm TA Type 12 (24 Type 8 torpedoes);
Aviation group 1 catapult, up to 2 seaplanes.

Armament (After modernization)

Artillery 5 × 2 - 203mm/50 Type 3 No. 2.
Anti-aircraft artillery 4 × 2 127 mm / 40 Type 89, 4 × 2 - 25 mm / 60 Type 96 (up to 48 by the end of the war), 2 × 2 13.2 mm Type 93 machine guns.
Mine-torpedo armament 16 (4 × 4) - 610 mm TA Type 92 (24 Type 93 torpedoes).
Aviation group 2 catapults, up to 4 seaplanes.

During the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea in November 1944, mines, torpedoes, bombs and artillery fire sank many Japanese ships. Some of them lay at a relatively shallow depth accessible to divers, and the command of the US Navy decided to search these ships for secret documents and other information regarding Japan's military plans. This task was entrusted to the divers and crew of the Chauntecleer, a submarine rescue vessel. One of the ships from which the implementation of the planned operation began was a Japanese light cruiser, lying at a depth of 30 m with a slight roll to starboard. The first to go under the water was diving foreman Joseph Karneke. Going down to the deck of the ship, he proceeded to inspect it and soon saw the gun, which still had his dead crew. People froze in those positions in which they found the explosion of a bomb or shell. Death was instant. In the chart room, Carneke found an unusually large number of maps and papers. He collected them all and brought them to the surface. The documents were of great interest to the intelligence representative who was on the salvage ship; divers were ordered to thoroughly search all the premises of the sunken cruiser and take away all documents, including personal ones. Papers delivered to Carneke revealed that he had found the mythical Nachi, the flagship of Vice Admiral Kyoshide Shima, a ship the Japanese boasted was unsinkable. And, indeed, until his last battle, Nati managed to withstand hits from 225-kilogram bombs, as well as torpedoes, missiles and shells. However, on May 5, 1944, he was intercepted while trying to break out of Manila Bay and took the hit of 9 torpedoes, 13 bombs of 450 kg and 6 of 110 kg, as well as 16 missiles. This was finally enough, and the cruiser went to the bottom. Carneke discovered that each compartment of the ship was absolutely watertight: it did not communicate with neighboring compartments either through hatches or doors, so damage to any compartment did not entail flooding of other rooms. Thick steel armor covered both the deck and the hull plating. The divers worked in pairs, with one of them entering the still unexamined room, the other watching its hoses and line. Once, during the work of such a pair, when one diver was raking books and documents into a bag, the other briefly stopped watching his comrade and, having passed along the corridor, wandered into the next room in search of souvenirs. As soon as he entered, the door, slamming shut under its own weight as a result of the roll of the ship, severed the cable through which electric power was supplied from the surface for underwater lamps. Caught in complete darkness, the diver lost his head and, forgetting that he could easily find his way back along the rescue line, began to scream in despair. His ward had to come to his aid. Since then, the hunt for souvenirs on the Nati has ceased. “There is hardly anything else that disciplines a diver so well,” Carneke remarked, “as the cry he heard underwater. Once, Carneke himself cut a hole in partition bulkhead. The explosion of the unburned part of the gas mixture that had accumulated at the ceiling of the compartment knocked him off his feet, and the earpiece of the phone, torn from its socket, hit his temple hard. Carneke got up and, still not quite recovering himself, stuck his foot into the hole he had cut. At the same moment, he felt a death grip on his boot. I had to call for help from the second diver Krassica, who took a good 20 minutes to free his comrade's leg. Carneke went to the surface, and Crassike stayed behind, trying to discover the unknown monster that had so treacherously attacked his colleague. A few minutes later he gleefully announced on the phone, “Tell Karneka that his foot is stuck in a Japanese toilet.” The divers eventually found the ship's safe and blew it open with a putty-like substance known as Composition C, which is twice as explosive as TNT. A diver named Posey was sent down to examine the contents of the safe. When he reached him, he reported that the safe was full of money. Posey was ordered to return immediately, to which he replied that he was entangled in cables and hose, but in a few minutes he hoped to free himself. Finally, he appeared on the surface and climbed onto the deck of the rescue vessel. Banknotes stuck out from behind his belt, cuffs, in a word, from any place suitable for this. Only when the helmet was removed from him, he was able to see how precariously he hid his treasure. “Lord,” he wondered, “how did all this stick to me? Anyway, he did not lose much, since the money turned out to be Japanese banknotes in denominations of 10 yen: money was transported on the Nachi to pay maintenance to Japanese sailors. Intelligence officials were very happy to find 2 million yen, since the Japanese currency needed for some covert operations has always been difficult to get. But even more delighted were their documents found by divers. Among these papers, as a naval intelligence officer later told the divers, were plans for military operations against the Allies, information about the Japanese defenses and their preparatory measures in case of an Allied landing. It is rare, if ever, that so much important military information has been found in one place.

IN PIRL HARBOR

Mainland ports during the Second World War were practically not subjected to any significant destruction. A real tragedy from a military point of view was the unexpected attack by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, on the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, which numbered 86 ships. Although the Japanese lost 48 of the 100 raiding aircraft and 3 baby submarines, the US Navy lost 3,303 men and the battleship Arizona. Serious damage was caused to four other battleships: "Oklahoma", "Nevada", "California" and "West Virginia". In addition, three destroyers, a target ship and a minelayer were completely disabled. At Pearl Harbor, the divers had to perform a huge amount of work, which, moreover, had to be completed as soon as possible and carried out in conditions of a constant shortage of materials and various types of supplies. It was necessary to repair the giant holes in the ships lying at the bottom, and then pump out the water from them. Joseph Carneke was instructed to determine the size of the damage to the battleship West Virginia, with a displacement of 33,000 tons. The ship's superstructures remained intact, and from the side it seemed that the battleship's draft was simply slightly higher than normal. In fact, the ship lay at the bottom. It was assumed, however, that the size of the underwater hole is small and can be easily repaired. Carneke plunged into the water at the starboard side of the battleship, which was listing in the same direction. The salvage ship was placed almost close to the side of the ship. Having reached the bottom and almost got bogged down in a thick layer of silt, Carneke tried to feel the skin of the battleship with his hand. In vain. He moved forward in the direction where, in his opinion, the board should have been. Nothing again. A few more steps. The battleship is gone. Realizing the absurdity of the situation, the diver reported upstairs by phone: - I can not find the ship. “You were on the right track,” the puzzled assistant replied. - I followed the air bubbles, they disappeared inside the battleship. It was only then that Carneke realized that the hole was so large that he entered it without noticing it. He continued on his way and after 10 m came across some debris. The next day, Karneke, along with another diver, determined the size of the hole. Its length reached almost 32 m, height - 11 m. Five torpedoes dropped one after another neatly pierced the side of the giant ship. The remnants of torpedoes carefully collected by divers made it possible to establish that Japanese torpedoes with piston engines were much superior in combat qualities to American ones equipped with steam turbines. As the survey progressed, it became more and more obvious that the rise of the West Virginia would be a very technically difficult operation and the usual plasters and patches, hastily placed by divers, were indispensable here. Nevertheless, the so-called specialists (who knew nothing about ship recovery or the practical possibilities of divers) showed concern and impatience. - What are you waiting for? Why don't divers get to work? they asked. “We are waiting for you to explain to us what divers should do,” Carneke answered them patiently. - It's so clear! You just need to raise the battleship. Carneke, appointed head of the diving operations, turned to the diver Tex Rutledge, already dressed in a spacesuit, and ordered him to go under water at the side of the West Virginia. A few minutes later, Rutledge, who had reached the bottom, asked him by phone what he should actually do. Carneke, in turn, asked for clarification from a nearby specialist. Tell him to get to work! the important person snapped back. - Which one exactly? Rutledge insisted. “The ship is sitting at the bottom,” Carneke answered him without entering into an explanation. - We have to pick it up. Start working. A little later, moans, grunts and groans were heard from the handset of the amplified telephone, carried by the speaker throughout the rescue vessel. The diver was clearly working hard on something. - What are you doing? exclaimed Carneke, skillfully feigning extreme concern. - What am I doing? Rutledge gasped. “I've got under the bottom of that damned battleship and I'm lifting it up. Didn't he get up a bit?

PALOMARES

The most expensive operation in the history of mankind to raise sunken property from the seabed lasted almost three months - from January 17 to April 7, 1966. 18 ships of the Navy took part in it and a total of 3800 people were employed. The costs associated with this operation amounted to $84 million. Despite the complete technical success of the rescue operations, the reputation of the rescuer, in the role of which the US government acted, was, as they say, seriously tarnished. It all started on Monday, January 17, 1966, with a US Air Force usual flight. One of the B-52 strategic bombers, carrying a round-the-clock patrol in the air, was supposed to refuel without landing from a KS-135 tanker aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Spain. Refueling started at 10:11 am. Aircraft - a bomber and a tanker - were separated by a distance of about 50 m, they flew at a speed of 600 km per hour at an altitude of 9300 m. Somewhere below was the Spanish village of Palomares, whose population, engaged in the cultivation of tomatoes, onions, beans and oranges, totaled 1200 souls . Suddenly, one of the bomber's eight engines caught fire and immediately exploded. The flames engulfed its entire wing and instantly spread to the tanker aircraft. At 1022 hours, when the planes were a mile from Palomares, the bomber crew decided to make an emergency release of nuclear weapons. At the same moment, the bomber exploded, and the tanker aircraft was engulfed in flames. Those crew members who survived this sea of ​​fire began to parachute from their falling apart planes. Burning debris rained down. Both aircraft fell to the ground and exploded, their wreckage was scattered over an area of ​​39 km2, the remains of the aircraft burned out for 5 hours. pilots. At that time, five miles from the coast was a tiny fishing trawler "Manuela Orts Simo", owned and skipped by forty-year-old Francisco Simo Orts. About 100 m from his ship, a striped parachute splashed down, from which a small light blue object was suspended. A few seconds later, a large gray parachute fell from the sky with a metal object attached to it longer than a human being. Simo went to rescue three pilots from a B-52 bomber who had safely splashed down nearby, but in his visual memory, honed over 17 years of sailing near his native coast, the place where unusual objects fell was reliably imprinted. Soon the sky over Palomares was filled with search and rescue aircraft, and dozens of fishing boats, boats, yachts, dry cargo ships and even tankers were already plying the sea off the coast of this little-known village in search of survivors of the crash pilots and the remains of exploding aircraft. The next morning at Palomares came in large numbers with aviation specialists, engineers, accident experts, scientists; by evening their number had reached 300. A tent city was set up to accommodate such a large number of people; the fields surrounding Palomares were declared (for reasons little known yet) a restricted area. Aliens roaming around Palomares held Geiger counters in their hands. On January 20, the US Air Force issued a sparse communiqué acknowledging that the ill-fated B-52 had a nuclear weapon on board: weapons, standing on a safety platoon. A radiological examination of the area showed that there is no danger to the life or health of people ... ". Three nuclear bombs were found on land near Palomares eighteen hours after the disaster, although official reports continued to state that there was only one such bomb aboard the crashed B-52. The TNT equivalent of each of the bombs found was 25 megatons, in other words, the destructive power of each of these bombs was 1250 times greater than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. If at least one of them exploded when falling to the ground, absolutely everything living within a radius of 15 km from the epicenter of the explosion would be instantly destroyed (which would mean the death of over 50 thousand people), and everything would burn out within a radius of about 100 km from the epicenter, that only could burn; destructive radioactive fallout in the event of such an explosion would fall on an area of ​​tens of thousands of square kilometers. Nuclear weapons are designed in such a way as to exclude the possibility of their accidental detonation. The Palomares crash was the thirteenth publicly reported accident of an American nuclear-armed aircraft; none of the previous accidents had a nuclear explosion. The bombs lost over Palomares are hydrogen bombs, i.e. the splitting of hydrogen nuclei is caused by the explosion of a "regular" atomic bomb, and the latter, in turn, explodes with TNT. The TNT explosion occurs as a result of the synchronous operation of several detonators connected to an electric battery, and all the detonators must fire simultaneously, otherwise the TNT explosion will be uneven and, instead of compressing the radioactive mass, it will simply scatter it in different directions. So, there was no nuclear explosion in Palomares. However, the combing of the area around Palomares by 600 people (as of January 21), armed with Geiger counters and electronic equipment, suggested that not everything went well this time, so all attempts by the Americans to keep a secret about the consequences of the disaster looked simply ridiculous. Here is one example. The reporter. Is there any danger of radiation, or are you just taking precautions just in case? Public Information Officer, We refrain from making any comments. The reporter. Where can we get the information we need, Colonel? Public Information Officer. At least not for me (pause). I can't report anything on anything, and I can't say why I refrain from making any comments. In Washington, two days after the Palomares disaster, an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee met, at which the following decision was made: the search and recovery of weapons located on the seabed are assigned to the naval forces, while the costs associated with the search and recovery, carries the branch of the armed forces at the disposal of which the indicated weapons were before the disaster. In other words, the Navy must raise a bomb from the bottom of the sea, and the Air Force must pay the money for this. To carry out this unusual task, an impressive armada of ships has accumulated at sea off the coast of Spain. The Kiova sea tug arrived first, followed by two minesweepers, the Sagecity and the Pinnacle, which were later joined by two more minesweepers, the Skill and the Nimble. In addition to these vessels, the operational formation created to find and raise the bomb included the destroyer MacDana, the landing ship Fort Snelling, the squadron tanker Nespeley and the submarine rescue ship Petrel; the latter was equipped with sonar and diving-search equipment necessary for the upcoming operation. Rear Admiral William Guest, Deputy Commander of the Naval Strike Force in Southern Europe, was appointed the head of the operation to raise the sunken bomb, Vice Admiral William Ellis became the commander of the task force. Guest was provided with the latest equipment for underwater work. First of all, Guest requested in Palomares a Westinghouse sonar designed to explore the seabed - a cigar-shaped "fish" with huge fins-rudders, towed 10 m from the ground at a speed of one knot. Then a deep-sea television installation was delivered to Spain, the cameras of which, adapted to work at a depth of up to 600 m, transmit a television image to a screen located in the premises of a surface vessel. Honeywell Corporation delivered a sonar to Palomares that automatically determines the distance to any object detected under water, the direction of its movement and the depth at which it is located. Onshore, the US Oceanographic Administration was engaged in setting landmarks, because when searching for small objects at sea, the most difficult thing for the search team is to determine their own location and the location of the discovered object. Guest was placed at the disposal of an impressive group of expert submariners; among them 130 military divers and combat swimmers, many of whom were specialists in the disposal of unexploded bombs. Guest's chief consultant was Commander J. B. Mooney himself, who in August 1964 operated the Trieste bathyscaphe and discovered the remains of the Thresher submarine. The working group included a large number of civilian specialists who puzzled over the question: what will they have to look for? For the ranks of the public information department kept deathly silence on this matter. After a few days, however, the object of the search turned into an open secret. It became clear to everyone that four bombs had been lost over Palomares, and that the fourth bomb, which had not been found despite the most thorough searches on land, had probably fallen into the sea. On January 26, Guest for the first time caught the eye of a written report about a statement made by Francisco Simo, an eyewitness to the Palomares disaster. Rybak claimed that he could show the exact location of the fall of unusual objects with parachutes. Since literally hundreds of eyewitness reports accumulated at the command of the operation, Simo's statement was not given due attention. The command believed that when searching for the missing bomb, one should be guided primarily by logic, combined with method and perseverance, as was the case with Thresher. To do this, taking into account all available data, determine the area within which the most likely bomb site is located, and then "comb" this area using the most modern search equipment. Based on these considerations, Guest gave the following order: to search for and locate all the remnants of the disaster, including the lost bomb; make sure that the wreckage found is really related to the strategic bomber that exploded over Palomares and mark them with buoys; to raise all that remains of the catastrophe. Finding a hydrogen bomb on the sea floor was a very difficult task. The bottom relief at Palomares is very uneven. Rocky soil is intersected by gorges up to a kilometer or more deep. The rocks in many places are covered with silt and other bottom sediments, which, when underwater vehicles approach them or when divers approach them, rise from the bottom, thus worsening visibility under water. During the work, sonar instruments registered several “contacts” at a depth of 150 m or more, but there was no way to raise the detected objects to the surface. Sonar contact is just a reflection of the signal from the sensor submerged in water. Such a signal may equally indicate that the sensor has detected the remains of an old shipwreck, a rock, or the bomb being sought. Guest demanded to send him equipment for lifting objects from great depths. The bathyscaphe "Trieste-II" and "Deep Jeep" were sent to Palomares - a cigar-shaped, no larger than a minicar, underwater vehicle. The “Deep Jeep” lowered into the water could move due to the presence of its own propulsion complex and inspect the soil with the help of television cameras and powerful searchlights. The big drawback of this apparatus was the lack of equipment for lifting any objects from under the water. At the request of the then US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the experimental submersibles "Alvin" and "Aluminaut" belonging to American private organizations were placed at the disposal of Guest. The Alvin, a submersible with a length of 6.7 meters and a mass of 13.5 tons, is capable of staying under water at a depth of 1,800 meters for a day and taking on board a crew of two. At the specified depth, the Alvin moves at a maximum speed of 4 knots, its diving range is 15 miles. This apparatus was equipped with a magnetic compass, an echo sounder, a hydroacoustic communication system, a closed-circuit television system, and an all-round sonar. In addition, it was planned to install a telescopic manipulator for capturing objects, which was not yet ready by the time Alvin arrived in Palomares. The Aluminaut submersible was even larger. Its length was 15.5 m, weight - 81 tons. It was assumed that it would be equipped with two metal manipulators for capturing objects. The US Department of Defense sent another underwater vehicle, the Kabmarin, to the bomb search site, capable of being under water at a depth of up to 270 m for six hours and moving there at a speed of 2 knots. This apparatus was equipped with electronic equipment much worse than the Alvin or Aluminaut, but it made it possible to conduct a visual survey of the seabed and to place marker buoys over objects found under water. "Aluminaut" was delivered to the search site on February 9th. By this time, over 100 items were found on the bottom of the sea near Palomares, which could be related to the exploded bomber. Navy specialists, meanwhile, were trying with the help of computers and complex mathematical methods to establish the true coordinates of the tanker and bomber at the time of the explosion. As a result of the calculations, which were based on data on the location of hydrogen bombs found on land, the zone of the greatest probability of a “stray” bomb falling was determined - a triangle up to 10 miles high and about 20 miles base. On February 10, the Aluminaut and Alvin submersibles were ready to be launched, but the mistral, blowing at a speed of 60 miles per hour, stirred up the bottom silt, and visibility under water was reduced to 1 m. was not sunk. All search operations had to be suspended for several days. On February 15, the submersibles began to work. Items previously seen with sonar equipment were examined; some of them turned out to be the wreckage of a B-52 bomber. Soon the submersibles got more work to do: a mock nuclear bomb was dropped from a B-52 bomber in order to get at least a rough idea of ​​\u200b\u200bwhat could happen to a real one that fell from a flaming bomber. This model is also lost in the depths of the sea. The Mistral calmed down, the storm ended, and search operations were launched in full force. A kind of division of labor was established. At a depth of up to 40 m, scuba divers worked, a depth of 40 to 60 m was administered by divers using breathing apparatus with a helium-oxygen mixture; at a depth of 60 to 120 m, reconnaissance was carried out with the help of hydroacoustic instruments and the Kabmarin underwater vehicle, hastily equipped with a mechanical “hand” for capturing objects. Depths of 120 m and more were "combed" by a sonar for the study of the seabed, underwater television cameras and apparatuses "Alvin" and "Aluminaut". More and more specialized vessels, stuffed with the most sophisticated equipment, arrived in the search area. For example, the research oceanographic vessel "Mizar" was equipped with winches, on which an armored cable with a length of about 5 thousand meters was wound. m, designed for towing along the bottom of the sea, the so-called "fish sled". On these skids, an underwater installation for tracking a target, a sonar, a body and cameras were mounted. In other words, this ship was equipped with everything necessary to find the missing bomb and "point" underwater vehicles at it. The squadron tug Luiceno was equipped with a decompression chamber, a towing winch and a heavy lifting winch; the latter very soon came in handy for lifting the wing section of the B-52 bomber, which weighed 9 tons, discovered by scuba divers. The Hoist was intended solely for lifting aircraft wreckage. The ship "Privateer", placed at the disposal of the Navy by the American corporation "Reynolds aluminum", was equipped with the latest electronic equipment, including a sonar communication system, with the help of which negotiations were carried out between the "Privateer" and "Aluminaut" at a distance of up to 11 km. Seven weeks have passed since the death of the B-52 bomber. On March 1, 1966, the US government finally decided to publicly admit that several hydrogen bombs were lost during the disaster, one of which has not yet been found. One can guess that the unfortunate public information officer who was most pleased with this revelation, who until this time had to dodge at press conferences something like this: “Maybe you think we have found what you think we are looking for.” ? (Long pause). So, you can think whatever you want. But don't imagine that this is true. By announcing the loss of the bomb, Washington decided to tell the world the whole truth. It was announced that the fragments of two of the three hydrogen bombs found on land were destroyed, the TNT charge in them exploded, scattering around the radioactive metal of the atomic "fuse" - uranium-235 and plutonium-239, the half-life of which is about 24,400 years. Of course, there is nothing to worry about. All you have to do is carefully remove the top layer of fertile soil from an area of ​​100 hectares, immerse this land in 5,000 200-liter barrels, take them to the United States and bury them in a cemetery for radioactive waste. By March 3, 200 underwater items had been discovered and registered. "Alvin" made 50 dives under water. With the help of "Alvin" and "Aluminaut" a large amount of the wreckage of the deceased bomber was raised to the surface. Meanwhile, Francisco Simo Orts did not stop taking search participants to his section of the sea, patiently watching how the Americans put on maps the coordinates of the parachute splashdown point indicated by him, and then they go away. The depth of the sea in the place indicated by the fisherman exceeded 600 m, so only the Alvin and Aluminaut devices could dive to such a depth. The incredulous Navy specialists made this experiment several times: taking advantage of the fact that Simo left the deck in order to have a snack with what God sent, they quietly took the ship to a new place, and upon Simo's return to the deck, as if by chance, they asked him if he was really I am sure that this is the very place where the parachutes fell. And Simo invariably answered: “After all, you moved the ship. The place I mentioned is over there. Operation leader. Guest began to lean toward the idea that Simo was one of those rare people who are truly endowed with excellent powers of observation. On March 8, US Ambassador to Spain Angier Biddle Duke, at the risk of catching a cold, bathed in the sea near Palomares to demonstrate to the world that the sea was not contaminated with radioactive substances. How the world reacted to such a bold act of the American diplomat, alas, was not reported in the press. By March 9, 358 underwater objects had already been discovered off the coast near Palomares. The ownership of over 100 of them had yet to be determined, and 175 aircraft fragments, weighing from a few hundred grams to 10 tons each, were raised to the surface. But the bomb has not yet been located. Guest began to fear that a bomb with a parachute attached to it could be dragged into the sea by strong tidal currents. He decided to declare an area of ​​70 km2 around the place indicated by Simo as "the second most likely bomb zone." In accordance with this decision, on March 15, the Alvin submersible entered the sea area indicated by the Spanish fisherman; The Alvin crew decided to make a test dive and test the operation of the equipment at great depths. The dive started at 9:20. At the bottom of the sea in this area are deep valleys with steep slopes. At 11:50 a.m., the Alvin, following the curves of one of these slopes, reached a depth of 777 m. Visibility at this depth was only 2.5 m, but the crew members noticed a fragment of a parachute through the porthole. For several minutes, Alvin hovered over a depression about 6 m wide, illuminating it with its powerful searchlights, after which the code name of the hydrogen bomb was transmitted to the support vessel using a hydroacoustic communication system: "Dashboard". In order to find the bomb, operating from the starting point indicated by Simo Orts, it took Alvin only 80 minutes. But finding the ill-fated bomb is not all. Immediately there was a danger that Alvin, photographing an object covered by a parachute (for the final identification of it with a hydrogen bomb), could push it into a nearby crevice, too narrow for even a very small underwater vehicle to enter. In addition, there was a danger of detonation of the TNT charge of a hydrogen bomb from the slightest blow or push. For four hours, the Alvin crew photographed the item with a parachute, then, after receiving the appropriate order, all lights and engines were turned off on the Alvin, and the device continued to remain near the find as a sentry until the shift arrived - the Aluminaut deep-sea submersible. "Aluminaut" sank to the ground in an hour. With its help, a transponder device designed for sonar recognition was attached to the parachute. The hydroacoustic signal from the search vessel, acting on this device, activates it, and the transponder emits its own signal at a different frequency, which makes it possible to identify an object with a transponder attached to it and find it. Attaching the defendant to the parachute took three hours. "Aluminaut" had to stay at the find for another 21 hours - upstairs they were waiting for the end of the processing of photographs taken by "Alvin". Finally received photos confirmed that the find is indeed a bomb. Guest gave the find the name "Contact-261", the bomb was codenamed "Robert", and the parachute - "Douglas". Submersibles began to take turns trying to hook the parachute lines with lifting cables. With each such attempt, "Robert" dug deeper into the silt and slid closer and closer to the edge of the crevice inaccessible to underwater vehicles. On March 19, Guest ordered that these attempts be abandoned due to their futility. He ordered the crew members of the submersibles to try to anchor the slings or parachute canopy in order to drag the "Robert" to a more convenient place in shallow water, from where they could try to raise the bomb to the surface. On the same day, a severe storm broke out, making any work of underwater vehicles impossible. Only on March 23, "Alvin" was able to sink again under water. The submariners feared that as a result of the storm, the bomb would shift, completely bury itself in silt, or fall into an inaccessible crevice. But "Robert" patiently waited for them in the same place. A strong nylon cable with an anchor was lowered from the rescue vessel, and the Alvin began to maneuver, trying to hook the anchor on the lines or the parachute panel. It was very difficult to do this, because after each call of the Alvin, in order to hook the parachute, clouds of silt rose from the bottom, reducing visibility under water to almost zero, and each time one had to wait about half an hour until the silt settled. After one of the attempts, the bomb suddenly shifted and slid a meter towards the edge of the crevice. The Alvin hurriedly surfaced, giving way to the Aluminaut, which continued its unsuccessful attempts to hook the parachute. Guest and his consultants began to fear that Alvin and Aluminaut would never be up to the task. Therefore, they decided to call an underwater search vehicle, controlled from the surface, to the place of lifting operations. It was equipped with three electric motors, photo and television cameras, hydroacoustic equipment, and a mechanical arm for grasping various objects. This device was located in California and was designed to work at a depth of not more than 600 m; opening his mechanical arm proved insufficient to capture the bomb. It was quickly converted to dive to a depth of 850 m and delivered to Palomares on 25 March. They decided to use the mechanical arm to capture not the bomb itself, but its parachute. On the same day, or rather on the same night, the Alvin made another attempt to hook the parachute lines to which the bomb was attached with its anchor. At the same time, the underwater vehicle literally sat on a bomb and was almost covered by a parachute stirred up by the movement of water. When surfacing, the anchor of the Alvin was firmly hooked on the nylon lines. The rescuer "Heust" was immediately called to the place, who began to pull the bomb with a parachute along the slope of the underwater valley to a more convenient place. The parachute bomb weighed less than a ton; and yet, when the bomb was raised 100 m from its original position on the ground, the cable broke. He rubbed against the sharp edge of the anchor paw. The crew of the Alvin sadly watched through the windows as the Robert, together with a parachute, somersaulted along the slope of the bottom, approached the edge of the crevice and disappeared in a cloud of silt raised from the bottom. The Alvin was forced to surface because its batteries were exhausted, to replace it, the Aluminaut went under the water, which, following the signals of the transponder device attached to the parachute, found the Robert at a depth of 870 m near the edge of a deep crevice. Meanwhile, a storm raged on the surface of the sea, and lifting work was suspended. "Alvin" was able to go under water only on April 1, but by that time "Robert" had disappeared. It took four days to find the "prodigal bomb". On April 5, the TV cameras of the underwater search vehicle again found the "Robert" - the current washed away the silt into which the deadly projectile was buried. A mechanical hand managed to grab the silk of his parachute. Alvin went down under the water and made several attempts to attach a strong nylon cable to the mechanical arm, which was disconnected from the search apparatus. During one of these attempts, "Robert" began to slide towards the crevice. In a little over a day, he moved 90 m. The Alvin made another run, trying to attach a lifting cable to the mechanical arm; at the same time, he came too close to the parachute and was firmly entangled in it. Alvin's situation was aggravated by the fact that the charge of its batteries was supposed to run out in four hours. Fortunately, he managed to escape from the arms of the Douglas and surface. The next morning, Alvin, despite the stormy weather, again worked on the ground. The crew of the apparatus finally managed to attach the lifting cable to the mechanical arm. A few hours later, a search vehicle, controlled from the surface, descended to the ground, which, as if imitating the Alvin, also became entangled in the parachute lines. There was no crew on this craft who could, with the help of skillful maneuvering, free the craft from its tenacious nylon fetters. Quickly assessing the situation, Guest decided to raise a nuclear bomb before it was too late, along with a parachute and a search apparatus entangled in it. The rise of the bomb and the search apparatus was carried out at a speed of 8 m/min. During the ascent, the search apparatus suddenly broke out of the parachute fetters. The operators were able to pull it aside without damaging the lifting cables. When "Robert" was pulled to a depth of 30 m, the ascent was suspended, and scuba divers joined the operation; they girded the deadly cylinder with several slings. On April 7, at 8:45 local time, a three-meter bomb appeared above the surface of the sea. The ascent took 1 hour and 45 minutes. The hydrogen bomb was on the seabed for 79 days 22 hours and 23 minutes. Dosimetric control showed no leakage of radioactive substances. Demining experts defused the bomb's detonators. At 10:14 a.m., Guest uttered the phrase that ended Robert's odyssey: “The bomb has been defused. The next day, journalists accredited to the site of this unusual rescue operation were allowed to inspect and photograph the bomb, just in case, to stop possible rumors about the failure of the rescuers. This was the end of the most expensive rescue operation in the world.

The ensuing battle was later called the Battle of the Java Sea.

In early 1942, the Japanese Expeditionary Force continued to actively move south, increasingly closer to Australia. On February 15, the Japanese occupied the port of Palembang in Sumatra, threatening Java from the west. The Dutch Rear Admiral Doorman in Batavia (Jakarta), where he brought the ships that survived after the battle on February 4 at Balikpapan, had the cruisers Java, De Ruyter and Tromp.

Reinforced by the British heavy cruiser Exeter and the Australian light cruiser Hobart, this formation, which also included six American, three Dutch and several English destroyers, attempted to attack a Japanese convoy on February 14 in the Bangka Strait, in southern Java.

One destroyer ran aground and died. The rest of the ships were attacked by aircraft and had to return to base, although they were not seriously damaged. A few days later, the heavy cruiser Houston joined them.

On February 18, the Japanese landed on the southern coast of about. Bali. The island had an airfield, and it allowed to control the exits from the Java Sea in the area.

On February 19, Japanese carrier strike forces attacked the Darwin base in northern Australia, destroying two British ammunition ships, the destroyer Peary and all aircraft at the local airfield.

On the night of February 19, in the Badung Strait, Admiral Doorman made another attempt to attack two Japanese transports escorted by four destroyers. The Allied ships carried out the attack in three waves, but the Japanese did not lose a single warship or transport in this battle, while the attackers lost several destroyers, and the Java cruiser was damaged.

Another failure was the destruction by Japanese aviation of the Langley hydro-air transport en route to the port of Chilachap in Java, and then the military tanker Pecos, on which they tried to evacuate the rescued crew of the Langley in Ceylon. Of the more than 900 people aboard the tanker, only 220 were saved. The second air transport, the Seawitch, arrived safely at Chalachap, but its planes could hardly be of any use.

The Japanese, having captured Java from Bali in the east and from Sumatra in the west, were preparing for an attack. The commander of the Allied naval forces, Admiral Gelfrich, tried to use all the means at his disposal to stop the offensive. The British offered to withdraw the naval forces to be able to use them in the future, but the Dutch were determined to fight. Nevertheless, the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese in aviation was obvious, and it was impossible to stop their unstoppable advance by naval forces alone.

On February 27, when fuel supplies were almost completely depleted, Gelfrich agreed to withdraw the English cruisers Dragon and Danae, the destroyers Tenedos and Scout, and the Australian cruiser Hobart. Of the 13 American destroyers available to Admiral Doorman, only 4 remained operational. He also had at his disposal the damaged cruiser Houston, the English cruiser Exeter, the Australian cruiser Perth and 3 destroyers, as well as the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter, Java and 2 destroyers. Apart from submarines and a few aircraft, these were all the naval forces that could meet the enemy offensive.

In the afternoon of February 26, a message came that a large Japanese convoy was heading southwest near the coast of Borneo (Kalimantan Island). Apparently, the Japanese were going to land troops on the northern coast of Java. Admiral Doorman's heterogeneous formation was ordered to put to sea, conduct a night attack, and then withdraw to Tanjungpriok at the western tip of Java. The order required attacking the enemy until it was destroyed, but this was beyond the capabilities of the ships used to attack.

On February 26, in the afternoon, the squadron left the port of Surabaya. On the morning of the next day, she was bombed, but there were no losses. Around noon, Doorman reported that the personnel had reached the point of complete exhaustion and the ships were heading back to Surabaya to give the crews some rest. When the ships were already entering the harbor, Doorman was informed that several dozen enemy transports, escorted by cruisers and destroyers, were about 60 miles north of Surabaya, and 40 miles from them there was a large covering force.

The Dutch admiral immediately reversed course and ordered the rest of the ships to follow him. Having gone out to the open sea, the connection lay down on a north-western course. Due to good visibility, the ships were soon discovered by the enemy, and at 15:30 the first air raid took place. There were no losses. Admiral Doorman requested air cover from the shore, but it could not be allocated. The cruisers "De Ruyter", "Exeter", "Houston", "Perth" and "Java" were in wake formation. The English destroyer "Electra" was ahead of the column of ships. "De Ruyter" from the sides covered the destroyers "Jupiter" and "Encounter". American destroyers were at the end of the column, and two Dutch destroyers were 2 miles to their left.

It was an unfortunate order to fight. Destroyers were to be positioned ahead of the heavier ships, both to protect them and to take up a position convenient for a torpedo attack. However, the squadron was moving too fast, and the worn out machines of the destroyers did not allow them to take their intended place in the ranks in time. Around 16.00 enemy ships, consisting of four to seven cruisers, two heavy ships and thirteen destroyers, were found slightly to the right of the bow.

At 16:16, the Japanese ships opened fire from maximum range, and the Allied cruisers turned to the left to stand on the side of the enemy and point all their guns at him. The ships of both opponents for some time went on converging western courses. The Japanese were somewhat ahead, and the distance gradually decreased during the battle. Having accepted the battle, Admiral Doorman violated the order, since he was ordered to attack the enemy at night.

At first, Japanese shells fell around the Allied cruisers and did not cause any noticeable damage to them. Then the Japanese destroyers carried out a torpedo attack from a long distance. The Allied ships turned south to avoid the torpedoes, and shortly thereafter the cruiser Java was hit by a shell. The artillery duel continued until 17.10, when the Japanese destroyers fired another torpedo attack. While maneuvering, a shell hit the engine room of the Exeter cruiser, and its speed decreased to 15 knots. One of the Dutch destroyers was hit by a torpedo and sank. The Allied cruisers turned south again to avoid the torpedoes, but Be Ruyter fell behind, probably trying to close the battle.

The Australian light cruiser Perth and two destroyers placed a smoke screen between the enemy and the damaged Exeter. At this time, Doorman ordered a counterattack. One of the destroyers entered the smoke screen to carry out this order, but was met by direct fire from three Japanese destroyers. Having received a large number of hits, the destroyer sank. The second Dutch destroyer also tried to fulfill Doorman's order, but the enemy ships had already turned away and disappeared in the twilight. Another Dutch destroyer was damaged by her own depth charge, which accidentally fell overboard and exploded under the stern.

Doorman's cruisers were turned north again to renew the battle. They emerged from the smoke screen at a distance of about 10 miles from the Japanese cruisers. The control of the ships was carried out only with the help of a searchlight, because. the radio station on De Ruyter was damaged. Over the course of half an hour, Doorman relayed several conflicting instructions from the flagship. The American destroyers, not quite understanding what the commander wanted from them, launched a torpedo attack from a long distance, which forced the Japanese ships to turn away. Finally, Doorman signaled to follow him and headed northeast. Then, after a short skirmish in the dark with enemy cruisers, the formation turned south again and followed in the direction of Surabaya. Japanese aircraft continued to follow him, dropping illuminating bombs.

Around 21:00, off the coast of Java, the American destroyers ran out of fuel. All torpedoes were used up, and the commander of the destroyer group decided to go to Surabaya for fuel. There they found "Exeter" and "Witte De With", who arrived there after the battle. Four cruisers and two British destroyers still continued to search for the enemy.

One of these destroyers, Jupiter, was unexpectedly damaged at about 21:25 by an underwater explosion, which was attributed to a torpedo fired by the submarine. At 0130 Jupiter sank. The cruisers, heading north, found the remains of the personnel of the destroyer, which sank in the afternoon. The second destroyer - "Encounter" was ordered to pick up people and deliver them to Surabaya.

The cruisers were left without an escort, under continuous enemy surveillance and with virtually no communications. Nevertheless, Doorman considered it necessary to carry out the orders given to him and continued his attempts to find and attack the Japanese ships.

At 23.15, the squadron met with the Japanese cruisers Nachi and Haguro. In the ensuing battle, De Ruyter received a hit in the stern, which forced her to turn aside. The Java followed and was hit by a torpedo. Almost simultaneously, De Ruyter was also hit by a torpedo, and both ships were engulfed in flames. A few minutes later "De Ruyter" sank. The death of "Java" was not observed by anyone, but, apparently, this happened shortly after the death of "De Ruyter". The surviving Houston and Perth, which had already used up most of their ammunition, returned to Tanjungpriok in accordance with the order received before the battle.