The material is in many ways in tune with personal feelings about what is happening with the Russian navy, but at the same time contains something that has never been heard of before, namely, a new way to detect and track submarines:
« ... a technology that allows aircraft to carry out a radar search for submarines in a submerged (underwater) position according to the perturbations of the surface environment generated by them during movement (radar detects, as it were, "traces" on the surface of the water, which are left by a submarine going in depth)».
Of course, it became very interesting to understand what was at stake, since the author of the article, dear Alexander Timokhin, not only described the phenomenon, but also gave a fairly broad evidence base, with references to sources, including English ones.
So we have the thesis:
« Adding all of the above, we have to admit: the possibility of detecting a submarine using radar and optoelectronic surveillance of the surface of water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely denied by the modern domestic naval strategy.».
Let us study the sources on the basis of which the respected A. Timokhin formulated this thesis. So, the first is the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" ("Radar method for detecting submerged submarines"), published in 1975. The author of this article downloaded and diligently translated the English text, as far as it was in his power ( alas, the level of English proficiency is “reading with a dictionary”, so errors are possible). In short, the essence of the report is as follows:
1. Since the Second World War, and especially during 1959-1968. multiple cases of detection by radar of submarines following in a submerged position were recorded. Practically all types of American submarines that existed at that time were found at depths up to 700 feet (213.5 m).
2. Although in some cases it was possible to control the movement of submarines for quite a long time (up to 2 hours), but in general, such an effect was not permanent. That is, they could observe it at some point, and then not observe it: they could detect a submarine, immediately lose it and fail to restore contact, even knowing the position of the submarine.
3. And now - the strangest, and very unusual. The fact is that the radar did not detect a submarine at all - this is impossible, the radar does not work under water. It can be assumed that the radar detects some kind of traces above the submarine on the surface of the sea ... nothing like that! The radar detects disturbances in the airspace at an altitude of 1000-2000 feet (300-600 m) above sea level! It sounds completely crazy (which the author of the report himself admits), but, nevertheless, it has been repeatedly confirmed by observations.
To avoid misunderstandings with the translation, I will quote a fragment of the report in English:
« It is hard to imagine how a submerged submarine can give rise to an effect one or two thousand feet above the surface. It is indeed understandable why there might be skepticism. Nevertheless, it is an experimental observation reported on many occasions».
Then the author of the report points out that the US has not been able to come up with a theory that could substantiate such a phenomenon and tries to explain what, in his opinion, is still happening. Having considered various "sources" that, at least theoretically, could lead to such a phenomenon (thermal trace, the influence of magnetic fields, etc.), the author comes to the following conclusion.
The radar sees some kind of "air turbulence", and it is formed like this. It is known that the layer of air near sea water is saturated with water vapor and is in constant motion (convection). A large underwater body, which is a submarine, exerts pressure on the water in which it moves, including upwards (that is, the boat, as it were, “pulls apart” the water column, “pushing” the water in different directions). This pressure creates an underwater wave, directed upward as well, which, reaching the surface layer of water, changes it relative to its natural state (in the report, this effect is called the "Bernoulli Hump" (Bernoulli Hump)). And these changes provoke the direction of convective air movement and eventually create the same air turbulences that the radar detects.
The author points out that work in this direction in the United States was curtailed, and believes that this was done in vain, because the indicated effect, which makes it possible to observe submarines, although it does not occur on a permanent basis, is still observed quite regularly. And the lack of a theory why this happens is not a reason to stop working in this direction. Interestingly, the report ends with a classic horror story: Russian BODs are equipped with very powerful radars, stronger than those used by the United States to monitor submarines, which means that they probably figured everything out a long time ago and ...
Thus, we can summarize: according to American data and under certain circumstances, a submarine that is in a submerged position can be detected using radar. But ... I must say that the Americans took the underwater threat very seriously. The memory of the “Doenitz boys” was still fresh, and the Soviet fleet in the 50s and 60s was built mainly underwater.
Diesel-electric submarines of project 613. In the period 1950-1957. 215 submarines were built
And yet the Americans close the project. This can only mean one thing - despite many precedents at that time, the detection of submarines using radar did not reach the level of technology, that is, something that could give stable results when searching for enemy submarines. At the same time, there is no information that the Americans have resumed work in this direction. That is, we have a report in which the author considers it necessary to resume work on this project, but there is no evidence that his opinion was heeded.
The next argument in favor of the fact that the Americans not only resumed work on radar methods for detecting submarines, but also achieved complete success in them, is the story of Lieutenant General V.N. Sokerin, former Air Force and Air Defense Commander of the Baltic Fleet.
Without quoting it in full, let us briefly recall the essence: in 1988, the Northern Fleet conducted exercises during which 6 nuclear and 4 diesel submarines were deployed at sea. At the same time, each of them received its own sea area, where it was supposed to be, however, within the given area (and they were quite extensive), the commander himself determined where his submarine was located. In other words, until the end of the maneuvers, no one, including the fleet command, could know the exact location of the deployed ships. And then the patrol "Orion" of our "sworn friends" appeared - it passed over the submarine deployment areas in a strange, "broken" route. And when the officers of the fleet compared the maneuvering of our submarines, then:
« ... having superimposed on the map the route of the “movement” of the Orion, he made an unambiguous conclusion that all ten “turning” points of his actual path line were absolutely exactly above the actual location (for the duration of the flight) of all 10 (!) Submarines. Those. for the first time in 1 hour and 5 minutes, the second - in 1 hour and 7 minutes, one plane "covered" all 10 submarines».
What would you like to say about this? Just a couple of words about the person who told us this: Viktor Nikolayevich Sokerin, Honored Military Pilot of Russia, commanded the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet in 2000-2004 and ... left this post, like the ranks of our armed forces, writing a report "on his own" , in protest against the collapse of the naval (and not only) aviation of the Russian Federation. But he was "in sight", "in good standing" with our powers that be. I think it makes no sense to explain that no matter how bad a particular branch of the military is, its top officers always have the opportunity to ensure a comfortable and comfortable existence. It’s all about keeping quiet diplomatically somewhere, somewhere cheerfully reporting what they expect to hear from you ... Yes, only Viktor Nikolayevich was a person of a completely different warehouse, from those for whom the business he is engaged in is above all. I recommend reading his collection of poems - yes, not Pushkin's style, but how much love for the sky and airplanes is in it ... And also - V.N. Sokerin served in the north for a long time and was friends with Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze.
Of course, the author of this article wanted to know in more detail what V.N. Sokerin on the detection of submarines by radar methods. And here the strangeness began. The fact is that the respected A. Timokhin writes that V.N. Sokerina were taken by him from the article “What to ask Ash”, M. Klimov, but ... the problem is that they are not there. The author of the article, Maxim Klimov, mentions the discovery of 10 Soviet submarines, but without any reference to the respected V.N. Sokerin. Well, let's search.
Google reported that these lines are found in the article “Anti-submarine warfare. View from the S.S.S.R. ”, which came out from the pen of Semenov Alexander Sergeevich -“ There was direct evidence that the US Navy had gone much further in developing "non-traditional" search methods. I will give the testimony of the Commander of Naval Aviation of the Baltic Fleet...»
In confirmation of his words, A.S. Semenov gives an interesting screenshot:
I would like to note the following. The authenticity of this screenshot does not cause the slightest doubt. It is well known that V.N. Sokerin, after leaving the reserve, did not shy away from the Internet at all, by the way, there is his material on VO), he was also most likely present on the AVIAFORUM website, from where, in fact, this screenshot was taken. Alas, today the discussion thread in which this comment by V.N. Sokerin, is in the archive, so it is impossible to get to him "from the Internet". However, one of the forum administrators was kind enough to confirm the existence of this comment.
And here the author of this article found himself in a very ambiguous position. On the one hand, the words of Viktor Nikolaevich do not require any confirmation or evidence - they themselves are evidence. On the other hand… If this had been said in an interview, or stated in an article, there could no longer be any options. But the replica on the Internet, especially taken out of context, is still a little different. In communication on such forums “for their own”, people can joke, tell stories, etc., without thinking that someone will then “defend a scientific dissertation” on their words. Again, much has become clearer, it would be possible to read the entire thread of the forum, but alas, it is not. And it will not work to ask Viktor Nikolaevich - he left this forum many years ago.
But here is what else needs to be specially noted - reading the words of V.N. Sokerin, we still do not see direct confirmation that the radar method for detecting enemy submarines was brought to fruition in the United States. Dear V.N. Sokerin only talks about the fact that Orion detected the location of our submarines with high accuracy, and he himself is not the primary source of information (he speaks from the words of an unnamed officer) and makes the assumption that perhaps this is a consequence of the “Window” theme, which our abandoned, and the Americans advanced.
Royal Australian Air Force Orion
But remember that, in addition to hydroacoustic, there are other methods for determining the location of submarines. One of them is magnetometric, aimed at detecting anomalies in the Earth's magnetic field, which are created by such a large object as a submarine. Or, for example, infrared (which, by the way, should not be confused with radar in any case) - the fact is that a nuclear submarine uses water as a coolant, which is then discharged overboard, having, of course, a higher temperature than the surrounding sea or ocean. And it can be tracked. Of course, this method is only suitable for detecting nuclear submarines, but over time - who knows? After all, a submarine moves in the water column, “pushing” the water away from itself with a propeller or a water cannon, and in any case, this is friction. And friction, as you know, raises body temperature, and, in principle, the wake, probably at least a little, but warmer than the surrounding water. The only question is the "sensitivity" of surveillance devices.
That is, strictly speaking, the fact that the Americans spotted our submarines (which, in fact, V.N. Sokerin is talking about), does not yet indicate the triumph of the radar method for detecting submarines - perhaps the Americans used some other, earlier existing method by improving it.
By the way, what kind of “window theme” is this? Let's try to deal with this on the basis of the same article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from the U.S.S.R.” A.S. Semenov, especially since the respected A. Timokhin in his article "represents him as:" One of the "fathers" of the "Window" theme, an anti-submarine pilot from the Pacific Fleet»
The principle of operation of the "Window" A.S. Semyonov describes it this way:
« ... with the help of the airborne radar ... to find the same zones of disturbances, called the "Standing Wave". With some experience and radar tuning, they looked like concentric circles, several tens of kilometers in diameter with a boat in the center of this circle ... An attempt to apply this method on Il-38, Tu-142 was not particularly successful. It was clear that for such a purpose it was necessary to develop a radar of the appropriate frequency range».
Let us immediately pay attention to the fact that, according to its principle of operation, the “Window” is fundamentally different from what the Americans were going to use. Those were going to look for an “air trail”, and we have a sea trail, some kind of concentric waves ... or not? The fact is that when describing the work of "Windows" A.S. Semenov points out: “A brief description of the principle. From the story "Untradition".
What kind of "non-tradition" is this? And this is the story of the same A.S. Semenov. So what, the reader will say, can't the author take a description from his own "early" work? Of course, maybe this is normal, if only it weren’t for one “but”. Story genre. Simply by opening the page of A.S. Semenov at samizdat, we read (specially underlined in red):
Fantasy. No, it’s clear that “A fairy tale is a lie, but there’s a hint in it, a lesson for good fellows,” the work itself is based on the fact that the author falls into “himself”, that is, he returns to himself young in all the splendor of his life experience for years of service and creates an alternate reality. Often in such works a lot of things that really existed are revealed ... But the problem is that we can only guess which of what is said in the story is true and which is fiction. And that is to say - the work is not written in the simplest language, it, so to speak, is intended rather "for their own and for their own", that is, for those who are familiar with the hardships of the naval service firsthand, and who, apparently, are easily able to separate truth from fiction.
In general, A.S. Semyonov is a man who obviously knows, but what he wrote ... it turns out that it may be “so, not quite so, or even not at all like that.” But in this case, does it make sense to refer to his work?
And also, when reading his “Anti-submarine warfare. View from the S.S.S.R., which is positioned by the author precisely as an article, and not as a literary and fantastic work, this is what hurt the eye. A.S. Semenov, describing the state of our submarine forces (in short, according to A.S. Semenov - complete darkness, the Americans controlled us at every step and at any moment could take us for soft spots), refers to Vice Admiral Ryazantsev Valery Dmitrievich, the author of the book "In the wake of death." At the same time, A.S. Semenov characterizes Valery Dmitrievich as an extremely competent person.
So the whole point is that V.D. Ryazantsev in 2014 wrote an article with an extremely “talking” title: “Once again about sea tales and storytelling sailors”, in which, among other things, he paid attention to “Window”. According to him, the very beginning of work on this topic was a form of scam and juggling of facts that during intermediate tests the commanders of ships and aircraft received an order: “Bleed from the nose, but the results of the studies must be positive”, and that all this was done in order to get funding, and then:
« I would like to ask today those who have spent huge amounts of money: “Where is the new technology that would allow detecting foreign submarines? Where is the plane or helicopter on which this equipment is installed? There are no planes, no helicopters, no equipment. And there is no money. The theme "Window" turned out to be a soap bubble, a "Potemkin village", a dummy».
However, about all this A.S. Semenov does not mention, although his article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from the U.S.S.R.” was posted on "Samizdat" much later than the material of the Vice Admiral. However, the author is not at all going to reproach A.S. Semenov in deliberate concealment of information - after all, he was in no way obliged to read all the works of V.D. Ryazantsev and could well have simply skipped this article of his.
And here's what we get. An "alarm" sounds - the submarines of the Fatherland are in danger, the Americans are using a new method of radar detection of underwater submarines, they see everyone! However, when you begin to understand all this in detail, it turns out that the rationale for the “alarm” is:
1. A report born in 1975, from which it follows that work in this direction was once closed in the USA, and it is completely unclear whether they were resumed as a result of the report;
2. Forum remark of a very respected person;
3. And, finally, a work written in the fantastic genre "alternative history".
Here the question arises - is this base sufficient for declaring an "alarm"? Let everyone who reads these lines decide for himself.
And one more thing - under-ice detection of submarines. Here, respected A. Timokhin refers to the words of “another Navy officer, an experienced anti-submarine officer, commander of an anti-submarine ship, captain of the first rank A.E. Soldatenkov. All this is true - dear A.E. Soldatenkov really published his memoirs “Admiral's routes (or flashes of memory and information from outside), but ... we have to admit that A. Timokhin quoted A.E. Soldatenkov is not entirely correct.
The bottom line is that the familiar A.E. Soldatenkova really observed a certain ellipse around the place where the submarine soon surfaced. Moreover, such ellipses were recorded by radars before (outside the ice), but for a long time no one associated them with submarines, considering them to be just interference. Then they tied it up, already using radar reconnaissance satellites: “So, for example, in the Cuban region in the Caribbean Sea, an American submarine was detected by a satellite by the annular effect.”
Generally speaking, all of the above correlates perfectly with the data of the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" - similar formations were observed there as well. But then A.E. Soldatenkov is trying to explain the nature of this phenomenon... or rather, he is simply playing the reader.
« When the submarine moves in a submerged position, the specified diving depth is held by horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or autopilot. Accuracy of holding the set travel depth within ±5 meters. That is, a gigantic mass of metal (from 6,000 to 33,800 tons) makes vertical oscillations in depth, and along with the mass, its gravitational field also fluctuates. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of an underwater ship, with the intensity recorded by the measuring instruments, comes to the surface of the water, to the border of two media - water and air. This part of the gravitational field, at some identical level of its intensity, enters into resonant interaction with the surface layers of sea water and air».
For those who have completely forgotten the course of physics due to current troubles, we recall that the gravitational field is a fundamental physical field through which gravitational interaction between all material bodies is carried out. Moreover, the essence of this interaction lies in the fact that the force of gravitational attraction between two points is directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance separating them. That is, all the objects of the world are in the gravitational field - not only the “surface layers of sea water”, but also the Sun, Jupiter and Alpha Centauri interact with the same submarine, just the force of their interaction is negligible. But “a part of the gravitational field sticking out above the surface of the water” is, generally speaking, a physical and mathematical nonsense.
Of course, one could assume that the respected E.A. Soldatenkov simply did not quite correctly formulate his idea, and the “gravitational field of the boat” means the distance from it at which its gravitational attraction is able to noticeably affect some particles of air and water. But even in this case, his further explanation of this phenomenon does not look entirely scientific, and allows the respected author to be suspected of ... let's say, one of his favorite sea sports: "baking tales" by gullible civilians.
But what is important is that A.E. Soldatenkov prefaces his scientific calculations with the words "Regarding all of the above, I dare to suggest the following." That is, he directly writes that his words are nothing more than his personal hypothesis. At the same time, A. Timokhin's quote looks like A.E. Soldatenkov is absolutely sure, and does not feel a shadow of doubt in his words.
But the biggest question is not even that. As we said earlier, dear A. Timokhin in his article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse” made two key statements. The first is that modern technology makes it possible to detect submarines that are submerged and even under ice. And the second is that we completely ignore the existence of such opportunities.
So, to confirm the first thesis, A. Timokhin quotes a fragment of one of the chapters of the book by A.E. Soldatenkov. But for some reason he completely “forgets” to quote another fragment of the same chapter, in which A.E. Soldatenkov suggests ... that this method of detecting submarines is being used with might and main by the Russian Navy! We quote:
« But there are indirect signs that the polarization method for detecting submarines has made its way into life. So, for example, the hydroacoustic complex of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" (for all its perfection) could not provide complete coverage of the underwater situation during the tragic events with the Kursk APRK, nevertheless it had it. Moreover, one of the officers of the press center of the General Staff of the Navy openly said that the underwater situation at the crash site was being monitored by radar. This could be mistaken for incompetence or a slip of the tongue of a former political worker, but the officer told the truth, it's just that no one believed in it. In addition, nowhere in the open press is there any mention of work in the field of the polarization method for detecting submarines. And this happens in two cases: the first, when no one deals with this problem at all, the second, when significant progress has been made and the topic has been classified.
Another sign. An ultra-long trip of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" around the world to the Far East to participate in the exercises of the Pacific Fleet without escort ships. It seems to be a big negligence for the only ship of this class on the planet. But no, the BIP (or BIC) of the cruiser knew ALL the situation around the ship: surface, underwater, air, space, and would hardly let himself be offended. Another indirect sign: when communicating with the media in interviews with high naval commanders, tragic notes ceased to sound at the mention of an underwater threat from a potential enemy, and before that they were already torn from the consciousness of their own powerlessness. Plus, the loss of interest in anti-submarine surface ships and the reduction of OVR brigades in all fleets. Plus, the resumption of long-range aviation flights around the borders of the Russian Federation. After all, hundreds of tons of aviation kerosene are burned not only for training pilots».
It turns out badly: where the words of the respected A.E. Soldatenkov confirm the theses of the author of the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse”, they are not only quoted, but also presented to readers as a given (while A.E. Soldatenkov himself is only a personal hypothesis). And in cases where the opinion of A.E. Soldatenkova comes into conflict with the opinion of A. Timokhin, then what, it turns out, will we forget for clarity?
Well, what conclusion do you want to draw from all this? And no - at the disposal of the author there are no facts that would confirm or refute the assumptions of the respected A. Timokhin. And, despite all the above criticism of the evidence base on which the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse”, it may well turn out that its main postulates are still absolutely correct.
The personal opinion of the author of this article, which he does not impose on anyone, is as follows. It is most likely that a method for detecting submarines in a submerged position using radar does exist. But it, like other methods for detecting submarines (magnetometric, hydroacoustic, thermal, and now, according to some reports, some kind of “chemical” is also patented), is not a guarantee of detecting and destroying submarines, although it can work under certain circumstances - as well as all the methods listed above. In other words, it is quite possible, and even more than likely, that it will now be even more difficult for submariners, but, nevertheless, submarines as a class of warships have not at all lost their combat significance.
Indirectly, this point of view is confirmed by the following considerations. Suppose, at the end of the 20th century, the United States really invented a method that allows you to detect submarines with an efficiency close to 100%. But in this case, the very concept of American nuclear submarines, implying the ability to operate independently in the face of a strong enemy ASW, loses its meaning. Why, then, are the Americans increasing the pace of commissioning their newest Virginias? After all, it is quite obvious that sooner or later potential US adversaries will also learn this method and be able to detect American nuclear submarines operating near the bases.
In such a case, it would be logical to expect the creation of some completely new type of submarines, and perhaps the abandonment of them altogether, or at least a slowdown in the programs for building new nuclear submarines - but nothing of the kind is happening. And, most likely, this indicates that with the methods of searching for submarines in a submerged position by radar means, everything is not so simple.
But in any case, we need to clearly understand that the submarine is not at all a self-sufficient means of fighting at sea. Illusions that, by developing one type of naval armed forces, it is possible to solve the tasks of the Navy as a whole, one should say goodbye as soon as possible. A submarine, for all its pluses, is not a child prodigy, and submariners will only be able to inflict damage on the enemy in close cooperation with surface ships, land-based and deck-based naval aviation aircraft and in the presence of a developed system of maritime reconnaissance and target designation - over-the-horizon radars, spy satellites, networks of underwater hydroacoustic stations and so on and so forth.
Radar station (RLS), radar - a system for detecting air, sea and ground objects, as well as for determining their range, speed and geometric parameters. Radar is based on the ability of radio waves to be reflected from various objects. In classic pulse radar, the transmitter generates a radio frequency pulse that is emitted by a directional antenna. If an object is encountered along the propagation path of a radio frequency wave, part of the energy is reflected from this object, including in the direction of the antenna. The reflected radio signal is received by the antenna and converted by the receiver for further processing. Since radio waves propagate at a constant speed, the distance to the object can be determined from the time it takes for the signal to travel from the station to the object and back. In addition to the slant range to the target, radar can also determine the speed and direction of movement, as well as estimate its size. For radar, VHF and microwave bands are used; the first radar stations, as a rule, operated at frequencies from 100 to 1000 MHz.
Radars are classified according to a variety of principles; here are the most common parameters for their classification. By purpose, they distinguish between detection radars, control and tracking radars, panoramic radars, side-looking radars, meteorological radars; RLM target designation, counter-battery radar; RLM overview of the situation. According to the passage of the signal, active (with an active response) and passive are distinguished. According to the nature of the carrier, the stations are divided into: ground, ship and aircraft radars. According to the separation of the receiving and transmitting parts, combined and separate radars are distinguished. According to the method of operation, radars are divided into over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars. According to the type of probing signal, radars of continuous operation and pulsed are distinguished. According to the wavelength range, there are: meter, decimeter, centimeter and millimeter radars. According to the measured coordinates, they are distinguished: one-coordinate, two-coordinate, three-coordinate. According to the method of space scanning: without scanning, with horizontal scanning, with horizontal scanning with V-beam, with vertical scanning, with helical scanning, with beam switching. According to the method of displaying information, radars are: with a range indicator, with separate range and azimuth (altitude) indicators, with a circular view indicator with an azimuth-range indicator.
A distinction is also made between primary and secondary radars. Primary (passive) radar mainly serves to detect targets by illuminating them with an electromagnetic wave and then receiving reflections (echoes) of this wave from the target. Since the speed of electromagnetic waves is constant, it becomes possible to determine the distance to the target based on the measurement of various signal propagation parameters.
The device of such a radar station is based on three components: a transmitter, an antenna and a receiver. The transmitter is a high power electromagnetic signal source. It can be a powerful pulse generator. Depending on the design, the transmitter either operates in a pulsed mode, generating repetitive short powerful electromagnetic pulses, or emits a continuous electromagnetic signal. The antenna performs focusing of the transmitter signal and beamforming, as well as receiving the signal reflected from the target and transmitting this signal to the receiver. Depending on the implementation, the reception of the reflected signal can be carried out either by the same antenna, or by another, which can sometimes be located at a considerable distance from the transmitting device. If transmission and reception are combined in one antenna, these two actions are performed alternately, and so that a strong signal leaking from the transmitting transmitter to the receiver does not blind the weak echo receiver, a special device is placed in front of the receiver that closes the receiver input at the moment the probing signal is emitted . The receiver performs amplification and processing of the received signal.
Different radars are based on different methods of measuring the reflected signal: frequency method (based on the use of frequency modulation of emitted continuous signals; phase method (based on the isolation and analysis of the phase difference between the sent and reflected signals); pulse method (transmits the emitting signal only for a very short time , a short pulse (usually about a microsecond), after which it goes into receive mode and listens for an echo reflected from the target, while the emitted pulse propagates in space).
Secondary radar is used in aviation for identification. The principle of operation of the locator was to use the energy of the aircraft transponder to determine the position of the aircraft. The main feature is the use of an active transponder on aircraft. The principle of operation of the secondary radar is somewhat different from the principle of the primary radar. The device of such a station is based on components: a transmitter, an antenna, azimuth mark generators, a receiver, a signal processor, an indicator, and an aircraft transponder with an antenna. The transmitter is used to generate request pulses in the antenna. The antenna provides emission of request pulses and reception of the reflected signal. The receiver is used to receive pulses, and the signal processor is used to process the received signals. An aircraft transponder with an antenna transmitted a pulsed radio signal containing additional information back to the radar on request.
The first device fixing the reflections of radio waves was patented in 1904, the first experimental aircraft detection radars appeared in 1934-1935. And since 1940, various radar equipment has been mass-produced in Germany, the USSR, the USA, France and Japan. Radars were actively used during the Second World War, developing in stages, in accordance with the requirements of the military at the fronts.
Initially, aircraft detection stations in the UK were most widely used, which began to be massively installed on warships, and in 1937 they created the Chain Home radar detection network along the English Channel and the east coast of England, which consisted of 20 stations capable of detecting an aircraft at a distance up to 350 km. Over time, the radar began to be used to guide fighters to repel bombers. Thanks to radar, the British air defense system and the RAF managed to emerge victorious in the air war with Germany at the beginning of the war. In the future, the radar for detecting submarines from aircraft solved the problem of unblocking the empire's sea lanes. Aircraft stations, which appeared with the Allies in 1940, ensured the detection of submarines at a distance of up to 17 miles. Even a submarine going at a depth of several meters was detected by the onboard radar of a patrol aircraft at a distance of at least 5-6 miles. And already at the last stage of the war, radars for detecting enemy aircraft in the air significantly helped British and American bombers fight enemy fighters over German territory.
In 1935, the German company GEMA created the first radio detection device for the Kriegsmarine, and since 1937 radars have been installed on warships. Since 1941, submarines were also equipped with stations: this made it possible to successfully attack ships and vessels at night and in bad weather conditions, and in 1942, German submariners received the FuMB system at their disposal, which made it possible to determine the moment the submarine was exposed to the radar of an enemy ship or patrol aircraft . In addition, submarine commanders, evading enemy ships equipped with radars, began to actively use small false radio-contrast targets that imitated the cabin of a submarine. Since 1939, an early radio detection system has been put into operation in Germany. And since 1941, the Luftwaffe has been adopting the first aviation radars. Already by the middle of the war, Kriegsmarine radars in many respects began to yield to the Allied radars, and the fear of ship commanders to be detected by the enemy by their radiation reduced their use to a minimum.
Radar stations were put into service in the USSR in 1939 and were first used for long-range detection of aircraft in June 1941 when repelling German bomber raids on Moscow. In the future, the stations were used in the defense of Leningrad, Gorky, Saratov. In 1942, the first aviation radars for the Pe-2 aircraft entered service. Only since 1943, in the air defense system, guidance of fighter aircraft by radar stations began to be used. Gun guidance stations supplied under Lend-Lease were used in the USSR mainly for anti-aircraft guns. Radars were clearly not enough for counter-battery combat. Also, foreign-made radars were installed on the ships. Throughout the war, Soviet submarines had neither radar nor sonar. Moreover, periscope antennas appeared on submarines only in the middle of 1944, and even then only on seven submarines. Soviet submariners could not operate effectively at night, they could not go into non-periscope attacks, which had become the norm in the fleets of other countries, and in order to receive and transmit radio messages, it was necessary to float to the surface. During the war years, 1500 radars of all types were manufactured in the USSR, while 1788 stations for anti-aircraft artillery, 373 naval and 580 aviation stations were received under Lend-Lease. In addition, a significant part of the Soviet radars were simply copied from imported samples. In particular, 123 SON-2 artillery radars were an exact copy of the British GL-2 radar.
In 1940, the first long-range detection radars entered service in the United States, and two years later, radars for the automatic guidance system for anti-aircraft guns were introduced in the Navy. By 1945, the American Navy had developed and put into service more than two dozen radars used to detect surface targets. With their help, American sailors, for example, detected an enemy submarine on the surface at a distance of up to 10 miles. An important role in the development of American radars was played by the exchange of information with Great Britain, thanks to which the Americans received information about the latest developments, both of the Allies and Germany. The United States was the undisputed leader in the development of ship- and air-based radars. During the war years, the United States sent more than 54 thousand aircraft radars to the allies under the Len-Lease agreement.
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the development of radar in Japan was rather slow, despite the existing technical potential. The first Type 11 early warning locator was created just a few days before the entry into the war, in November 1941. During the war, the development of Japanese radar lagged behind other countries by 3-4 years. At the same time, the Japanese industry was ready to produce high-quality components, but the development of radar devices was random and unsystematic. The bulk of the Japanese radars were copied from German, British and American developments. During the war years, about 7.5 thousand radars of 30 types were built.
Approximately during the war years, about 150 thousand radars of various types and purposes were produced, incl. Great Britain 22 thousand, Germany - 20 thousand, USA - 96 thousand.
During the war years, hydroacoustics also stepped forward, on which the admirals did not make big bets before the war.
Sonar (sonar) is a means of sound detection of underwater objects using acoustic radiation. According to the principle of operation, sonars are passive and active.
Passive - allowing to determine the position of an underwater object by sound signals emitted by the object itself (noise direction finding). Active - using a signal reflected or scattered by an underwater object, radiated towards it by a sonar.
Active sonar "ASDIC" in its original primitive form was invented in Great Britain at the end of the First World War. The basic principle of its operation has remained unchanged to this day. However, over the past years, the effectiveness of sonar has increased significantly, the scale of its use has expanded, and the number of classes of ships from which it could be used to search for and attack enemy submarines has also increased. The basis is a transceiver that sends sound impulses in the required direction, and also receives reflected impulses if the package, having met an object on its way, is reflected from it. By rotating the transceiver like a searchlight, one can determine from the compass the direction in which the signal is sent, and hence the direction of the object from which it is reflected. By noticing the time interval between sending an impulse and receiving a reflected signal, you can determine the distance to the detected object.
During the war years, sonars with active and passive paths, as well as underwater sound communication stations, were developed and brought to mass production. And in June 1943, the first sonar buoys entered service with the American anti-submarine aviation. And to combat German acoustic torpedoes, the Allies developed an acoustic jamming device that was towed astern of the ship. German submariners widely used imitation cartridges that confuse enemy acoustics. High-frequency sonars installed late in the war on U.S. submarines made it possible to penetrate minefields.
The sonar was characterized by the following parameters. Depending on the frequency emitted by the sonar, the range of its action was determined. So, high-frequency sonars had a limited range, but could detect small objects. For example, mines. The pulse duration is also directly proportional to the range of the sonar. Its sensitivity depended on the power of the sonar.
One of the first post-war developments was the creation of the ship station "Guys-2".
"Development of Soviet radar technology" Lobanov M. M.
Radar technology as a means of reconnaissance and detection of air, surface and underwater targets and aiming weapons of destruction at them made great changes in the organization and conduct of combat operations of the Naval Forces of the Soviet Union.
The radar equipment of the fleet was to be developed in full accordance with the plan for the post-war development of the fleet and, with its entry into the ocean, together with sonar, to ensure their confrontation with any type of surface, underwater and air enemy. To do this, she had to match the combat capabilities and missions of ships of each class.
Detection station "Guys-2"
One of the first post-war developments was the creation of the ship station "Guys-2".
The station was designed to detect air and surface targets and issue target designation to the fire control systems of artillery of universal and anti-aircraft calibers on cruisers. The development of the radar was carried out according to the 3-year plan for the development of radar for 1946-1948. with the active participation and assistance of V.P. Kapelin. The tactical and technical requirements, approved by the command of the Navy on August 9, 1946, provided for the provision of circular and sector search, as well as target tracking with determination of the distance, heading angle and bearing.
To monitor the air and surface situation, the station was interfaced with remote all-round visibility indicators (VIKO), and to identify its own ships and aircraft, it was equipped with “friend or foe” identification equipment.
The station operated in the meter wavelength range with a radiation power of 90 kW.
State tests of the Gyuys-2 station were carried out on the Molotov cruiser of the Black Sea Fleet in the period August - September 1948 by a commission chaired by the squadron commander, Vice Admiral S. G. Gorshkov (now Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union), his deputy - cruiser commander captain 1st rank V.F. Petrov, fleet officers S.P. Chernakov, V. A. Kravtsov, B. I. Krasnoselsky, development manager A. I. Patrikeev and others.
State test results:
detection range in all-round view mode:
a) aircraft - from 140 to 290 cabins (depending on the flight altitude);
b) ships: cruisers - 115 cabins, destroyers - 85 cabins and minesweepers - 45 cabins;
c) coasts with a height of more than 1000 m - 750 cab;
dead zone for surface targets - no more than 4 cabs and for aircraft within 10–20 cabs;
range resolution - at least 3 cabs and heading angle - about 4 °.
The presented model of the Gyuys-2 radar station had significant advantages over other radar stations that were in service with the fleet: simplicity and speed of tuning, stability of the target display pattern on the indicators and high reliability in operation.
At the same time, the station had a significant drawback - the lobe antenna pattern, which made it difficult to detect aircraft at certain heights.
The Gyuys-2 station was put into service and put into mass production.
It is necessary to pay tribute to the team that created this station, which, using the experience and scientific and technical assistance of the radio industry, successfully coped with the development of a very advanced station "Guys-2" and was awarded the USSR State Prize. The award was received by A. I. Patrikeev, V. P. Antonov and naval officer V. A. Kravtsov.
Ship station "Reef"
The most important task for the Navy in the post-war period was the development of a station for detecting surface targets and target designation for naval weapons when firing at surface targets. The station was intended for installation on the ships KR, EM, TFR and TShch.
The creation of the station was provided for by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on a 3-year plan for the development of radar for 1946-1948. The development of the station was carried out with the assistance of V. D. Kalmykov under the guidance of design engineer I. A. Ignatiev. V. I. Yaroshenko, A. S. Ilyin and others were his active assistants.
A centimeter-range station with a radiation power of 150 kW, with a truncated parabolic antenna, was supposed to determine the distance to the target, its heading angle, carry out target bearing and have three modes of operation - all-round visibility, sector search and target tracking.
State tests of the Rif radar were carried out in the summer of 1948 on the Black Sea Fleet on the cruiser Molotov simultaneously with state tests of the Guys-2 radar by the same commission under the leadership of Vice Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.
Navy officers B. I. Krasnoselsky, S. P. Chernakov, V. A. Kravtsov, M. I. Glikin, and others, as well as industry representatives V. D. Kalmykov, I. A. Ignatiev, and others took part in the tests.
The results of state tests showed the following detection ranges: cruiser 200 - 220 cab, destroyer 140-160 cab, minesweeper 120-140 cab, submarine on the surface 60-70 cab, submarine periscope at a height of 1.5 m 10-15 cab torpedo boat 30–50 cab, milestones 10 cab.
Range accuracy: according to the all-round visibility indicator - 1 mile, according to the exact range indicator - 15 m, according to the remote PPI - 1.5-2% of the range scale.
For the heading angle, the median error was no more than 0.6%.
The Rif radar made it possible to detect bursts from high-explosive and fragmentation shells at ranges from 25 to 100 cab.
By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Rif station was put into service and became the main means of reconnaissance, detection and target designation on ships.
For the development of the Rif station, leading engineers I. A. Ignatiev, V. I. Yaroshenko and A. S. Ilyin were awarded the USSR State Prize. An active role in its creation and testing was performed by fleet officers I.K. Sapozhnikov, S.M. Arshansky, K.P. Sergeev.
Equipping the ships with the Gyuys-2, Reef, Redan-1 and Redan-2 stations provided the naval command with the ability to conduct naval combat in all weather conditions, day, night and in smoke.
Rangefinder "Stage - B"
The accuracy of artillery fire depends not only on the quality of the artillery gun and the perfection of the PUAZO, but also on the accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets and transmitting them to the guns during aiming. Optical means of naval artillery provided high accuracy of target bearing (in visibility conditions), but the accuracy of determining the distance by them, as in optical rangefinders of anti-aircraft artillery, was lower than radar.
Radar made it possible to create a shipborne radio range finder for determining distances to surface targets with great accuracy. Such a rangefinder was successfully used in the fire control systems of artillery of the main and universal calibers of cruisers, destroyers and patrol ships.
The development of the Shtag-B radio range finder of the centimeter range was carried out in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 3-year plan for the development of radar for 1946–1948. according to the tactical and technical requirements of the command of the Navy. V. M. Yastrebilov led the development with the participation of M. F. Kurtyukov and fleet officers V. N. Normak and I. L. Krengauz.
State tests were carried out in the summer of 1948. at the artillery range of the Navy by a commission appointed by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, consisting of fleet officers I. L. Krengauz, V. N. Normak, G. A. Perov, A. A. Nikitin and others.
Test results: destroyer detection range 120 cab; accurate tracking range 100 cab; the median error in measuring the distance is 15 m. The creators of the radar V. M. Yastrebilov, M. F. Kurtyukov, V. N. Normak were awarded the State Prize of the USSR.
Radar station "Zarya"
The Zarya shipborne radar station was designed to control torpedo and artillery fire on cruisers and destroyers.
The development of the station was carried out in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 6, 1949 in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in January 1949.
The designed and constructed centimeter-range station with a radiation power of 10 kW made it possible to detect, track and determine the range to a surface target and its heading angle and transmit these data to the systems of the torpedo fire control device (PUTS) and the artillery fire control device (PUS). The station also provided a determination of the deviation of the fall of artillery shells from bursts.
The determination of the heading angle was based on the principle of using linear scanning of the antenna beam within ±4° relative to the geometric axis of the antenna with a frequency of 17 Hz. To reduce the error in measuring the heading angle and to facilitate the working conditions of operators during pitching, stabilization was applied in the guidance drive circuit.
The Zarya station provided for three target tracking modes: manual, semi-automatic and automatic, carried out according to the data of the PUTS scheme.
State tests of the station "Zarya" were carried out in October-November 1950 on the destroyer "Fearless" of the Black Sea Fleet according to the program and methodology approved by the Main Headquarters of the Navy.
The chairman of the commission is the chief artilleryman of the Navy, captain 1st rank A. A. Sagoyan and the deputy head of the technical department of the head office of industry L. N. Solovyov, members of the commission are fleet officers M. I. Glikin and G. M. Latinsky, head of development I. U Lyubchenko.
The results of state tests showed:
detection range of a battleship - 320 cab, destroyer - 180 cab, minesweeper - 110 cab, submarine periscope 1 m high - 20 cab, coast - more than 320 cab;
range of observation of bursts from artillery shells of 45-130 mm caliber - 25-110 cab;
median errors in measuring the coordinates of targets in range - 15–18 cabs, in their heading angle - 1-1.5 da;
accuracy of determining the coordinates of bursts (for correcting shooting): in range - 0.5 cab and in angle - 3–4 d.c.;
target resolution: in range - 40 m, in angle - 2-5 d.c.
Based on the tests, the commission recommended that the Zarya radar station be adopted by the Navy as a torpedo and artillery fire control station and develop a version of the Zarya station for use in conjunction with mobile and stationary coastal artillery of 100-152-mm caliber.
The station "Zarya" was adopted by the ships of the Navy class "cruiser" and "destroyer".
For the creation of the station, leading development engineers I. U. Lyubchenko, I. A. Zameschaev, R. Sh. Keilin, V. I. Maslennikov, D. M. Tolstopyatov, N. D. Fainshtein and Yu. A. Shevelko, head the technical department of the head office L. N. Solovyov were awarded the State Prize of the USSR.
Artillery station "3alp"
In the 1950s, the Navy was armed with large and small ships of new designs with high speed, power and range of artillery and torpedo weapons, with new means of detecting and bearing surface targets, and artillery and torpedo fire control devices. The power of the fleet increased significantly and provided ships with access to the ocean.
New radar equipment was developed during these years for the new cruiser and destroyer class ships.
One of the newly created stations was the artillery radar of the main caliber "Salp", developed in 1948-1950. according to the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Tactical and technical requirements included:
detection range of surface targets - in accordance with the line-of-sight formula;
determination of the range to targets, own heading angle and the magnitude of deviation from the target, coordinates of the fall of shells in range and angle with their transfer to the PUS system;
wave range - centimeter;
radiation power - 65–70 kW.
During the development of the station, it was possible to duplicate its work with a torpedo-artillery radar of the Zarya type (and vice versa) and work together with the optical instruments of the ship (range measurement using a radar, its heading angle - with an optical sight).
The use of radio waves of the shortest - centimeter range ensured the detection of surface targets at long ranges and high accuracy in determining coordinates.
The antenna system was stabilized along three axes (rolling and pitching, yaw, according to the ship's vertical gyro), which ensured stable reception of signals in heavy seas and simplified the solution of the shooting problem.
The indication system (type B indicators) provided the station with a reliable determination of the accuracy of projectile hits.
The station had high operational reliability, and the unification of its main radio units and the inclusion of service equipment in them simplified the check of modes and tuning of the station as a whole.
In September - November 1950, the Zalp station underwent state tests on the Besstrashny destroyer of the Black Sea Fleet under the leadership of the chief artilleryman of the Navy A.A. Sagoyan with the participation of the development manager I.I. Solovyov and fleet officers G. A. Perov, G. M. Latin and M. I. Glikin.
State tests confirmed the specified requirements of the Navy and showed that projectile deviations from the target could be observed at distances that were 80-85% of the maximum range of the projectile.
In 1951, the second and third sets of Zalp radars underwent similar tests on the Yakov Sverdlov cruiser of the Baltic Fleet and confirmed the previously obtained results on the Besstrashny destroyer. For the first time in the practice of using radar, it was found that radar provides the determination of angular coordinates with no less accuracy than the optical sights of a ship.
Based on the results of state tests, the Zalp station was put into service and put into serial production.
For the creation of the station, leading development engineers I. I. Bakulov, A. P. Belyakov, V. S. Zhdanov, S. F. Komarov, A. P. Malievsky, L. V. Nekrasov, F. N. Chernykh, head of the main department L. N. Solovyov and fleet officer G. A. Perov were awarded the State Prize of the USSR.
Coastal radar "Zalp-B"
Taking into account the excellent tactical and technical parameters and the results of state tests of the Zalp radar, the Navy command ordered the development of a coastal version of the station to the same team. Such a radar was a complete analogy of the ship version, with the exception of some design features due to the location of the station on the coast and the absence of devices stabilizing the antenna equipment.
Control tests of the coast station, conducted in the Black Sea, confirmed the positive results of the ship version of the Zalp radar, and it was put into service under the name Zalp-B.
Zarnitsa station for torpedo boats
The Zarnitsa radar, designed to detect surface targets and low-flying aircraft, was developed in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 10, 1946 under the leadership of A. K. Baloyan, with the active participation of fleet officer I. K. Sapozhnikov.
According to the tactical and technical requirements, a centimeter-range station with a radiation power of 80 kW had to be serviced by one operator.
The station equipment was made in the form of compact blocks with a total weight of 57 kg. The antenna device was placed on the mast, and the main units - on the deck of the boat.
State tests were carried out in the period April - June 1948 on the Black Sea Fleet and showed the following results: the detection range of a destroyer - 75 cabs, a minesweeper - 58-93 cabs, a torpedo boat - 34 cabs, a submarine in a cruising position - 26-27 cab, in positional position - 20-25 cab, aircraft at an altitude of 100-300 m - 90-170 cab (depending on the flight path).
The maximum error in determining the coordinates by distance is 1.38 cab, by the heading angle - 2 °. Dead zone - 1.7 cab. The resolution of the station in range is 0.85 cab, in direction - 20 °.
By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral I. S. Yumashev, the Zarnitsa radar was put into service as a means of detecting torpedo boats.
For the development of the station, the team of creators was awarded the State Prize of the USSR.
Station "Flag" for submarines
The Flag radar station was designed to detect surface targets and provide torpedo fire from a submarine at enemy ships. The station determined the coordinates of the targets, its heading angle and range, and entered them into the torpedo fire control device (PUTS).
The radar could also be used for navigational purposes and operate both on the surface and submerged to the periscope depth.
The development of the station was carried out according to the 3-year plan for the development of radar for 1946–1948.
In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, the station had to operate in the centimeter range, be serviced by one operator, have a radiation power of 90 kW and detect destroyers at a distance of at least 5 miles, and aircraft at an altitude of 100 m - up to 25 km, with median range errors no more than 25 m, on the heading angle 3 da. The dead zone should not exceed 300 m.
The station equipment was made in the form of separate blocks placed in the wheelhouse of the central post of the submarine. The commander's remote all-round visibility indicator (VIKO) was installed in the conning tower. The antenna device was mounted on a lifting-rotating mast.
Target observation and target selection were carried out with the help of the operator's IKO and the boat commander's IKO.
Means of protecting the station from interference in the equipment were not provided, and for the secrecy of its work, a one-time circular search for a target or a search in a narrow sector was used.
State tests of the Flag radar took place in 1950 on a submarine of the Northern Fleet and showed characteristics that met the specified requirements. Based on these results, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Flag station was put into service and put into mass production.
Leading engineers who participated in the creation of the station, A. S. Polyansky, S. T. Zaitsev, N. A. Illarionov, V. D. Nikolaev, S. I. Portnoy, D. G. Falkov, M. A. Yakovlev and V.P. Chizhov, as well as fleet officer M.I. Glikin, were awarded the State Prize of the USSR.
Coastal radar "Lot"
The fixed coast station "Lot" was intended to detect surface targets and low-flying aircraft from the radio posts of the Navy.
The development of the station was carried out in accordance with the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 6, 1949 and in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements approved by the Navy command on January 9, 1949.
The station operated in the centimeter range with a radiation power of about 80 kW and was serviced by one operator.
State tests were carried out on the Black Sea coast in June 1950 by a commission chaired by Captain 1st Rank B. I. Krasnoselsky and members of the commission: development manager V. I. Tebin and fleet officer V. V. Bril and others.
The detection range when installing the station antenna above sea level at an altitude of 70 m was: for a destroyer - 250 cab, for a torpedo boat - 150 cab, for an aircraft - from 175 to 195 cab, depending on the flight altitude (50-1000 m).
The maximum error in determining the coordinates in range is 1.5–15 cabs, in the direction of –1.5 °.
Resolution in range - 2.5 cab, in direction - 5 °, dead zone - 2.5 cab1.
1 TsVMA, f. 2523, op. 0019470, box No. 169, l. 31.
According to the results of state tests, the Lot station was put into service.
In addition to those listed above, in the post-war years, several more centimeter-range radars for various tactical purposes (Vympel, Anchor, Lin, Fut-N) were created for the Navy, designed for installation on ships.
Station "Vympel", developed in 1946-1947. under the leadership of F.V. Lukin, was intended to control the fire of anti-aircraft guns on destroyers.
The Anchor station was used to control the firing of universal caliber guns on cruisers, destroyers and patrol ships. Its development was carried out in 1949 under the leadership of A. S. Grinshtein and his deputy Ya. A. Zabelev. The station differed from those previously created by the device for automatically tracking air targets in three coordinates, which provided increased accuracy in their determination. The design of this device turned out to be so successful that it was adopted in many subsequent developments.
State tests of the station were carried out in conjunction with other naval facilities under the leadership of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral-engineer N. V. Isachenkov and officers A. L. Genkin, A. A. Nikitin and others. The station made it possible to detect aircraft at a distance of up to 30 , and surface targets - up to 150 cab.
The Lin station was designed to detect surface targets and low-flying aircraft from patrol ships and minesweepers, and the Fut-N ship station was designed to detect air targets from cruisers and destroyers. Developed in 1948-1955. with the participation of B. N. Savelyev and under the leadership of F. V. Lukin and G. A. Astakhov, she passed state tests in the Baltic in 1955 and detected aircraft at a distance of up to 150 km.
The station was part of a large complex of shipborne radar weapons, intended for combating an air enemy.
All of the listed stations were adopted by the fleet and mass-produced by the industry.
The creation of shipborne radars for detecting surface and air targets and providing artillery and torpedo firing was a great achievement of their creators.
Development leaders V.P. Antonov. I. I. Bakulov, A. K. Baloyan, A. S. Grinshtein, I. A. Ignatiev,. F. V. Lukin, I. U. Lyubchenko, A. I. Patrikeev, A. S. Polyansky, A. A. Shishov, V. M. Yastrebilov and their assistants showed great skill, engineering creativity, a sense of state responsibility and Soviet patriotism and rightfully deserved high recognition and awards.
In the development of the first specialized shipborne radars and their modifications, one should note the engineer of the radio industry K.V. Golev, who was drafted into the army at the beginning of the war to operate the RUS-1 radar and was soon recalled to the research institute to participate in the development of new radars.
An important role in the development of the radar belonged to V. D. Kalmykov, whose career began as an engineer in the laboratory of a research institute and continued in senior positions as director of the institute and minister of the radio industry. For fruitful activity, V. D. Kalmykov was awarded the State Prizes of the USSR and the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
The leading role in equipping the Navy with radar equipment, organizing a radar service in the fleets, in training engineers, technicians and radiometer operators, supplying and repairing radar stations was the activity of engineer-captain 1st rank S. N. Arkhipov (later vice admiral engineer, laureate of the USSR State Prize ). During the war years, being the flagship signalman of the Northern Fleet, he understood from combat experience the role and significance of radar and, together with the commander of the fleet, Admiral G. A. Golovko, skillfully planned the use of radar facilities in the operations of the ships of the fleet. People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov noticed Arkhipov's organizational skills, his knowledge and experience of naval service, and in 1943 recalled him to a leadership job in the People's Commissariat. There, Sergei Nikolaevich Arkhipov, an authoritative specialist and respected boss, worked fruitfully until the end of his life.
His successor in the central office of the Navy was his deputy engineer-captain 1st rank A.L. Genkin (later vice-admiral-engineer, laureate of the USSR State Prize). He was the first among the military engineers of the Navy to engage in the practical development of radar technology in the Navy, and in 1940 he defended his dissertation for the degree of candidate of technical sciences in the field of radar.
For over 30 years A. L. Genkin has been successfully engaged in the development and application of radar technology.
A large positive role was played by many officers of the Navy who worked in the central office, in research and testing institutes, training grounds and centers. They participated in the development of tasks for new radar models, helped the developers with their advice and combat experience, installed new radars on ships and tested them, and then introduced them into the ship's service. Special mention should be made of such officers as V. L. Abramov, A. N. Verzhikovsky, G. G. Govako, V. A. Kravtsov, A. A. Nikitin, V. N. Normak, V. V. Osipov, A. G. Priymak, V. B. Rall, I. K. Sapozhnikov, and S. P. Chernakov.
Among these officers, A. G. Priymak (later Rear Admiral Engineer) and S. P. Chernakov (later Vice Admiral Engineer) took an active part in the Northern Fleet and were awarded combat awards.
Internet source:
http://hist.rloc.ru/lobanov/index. htm
An invisible ship capable of suddenly attacking from the most unexpected point - this is how submarines were conceived and until very recently they remained so. The secrecy of P. L. especially increased after the appearance of atomic and air-independent power plants (in the 50s of the XX century). The 20th century may someday be called the century of submarines. In the 21st century, the submarine fleet will either cease to exist altogether or change in the most radical way.
Mikhail Nikolaev
However, the submarine fleet in its current form is likely to die. The sea ceases to be a space where ships are able to remain invisible to the enemy. And this change occurred as a result of the emergence of systems that allow you to track any movement of any large underwater objects.
From direction-finding systems to integrated FOSS
The history of the development of submarines - and their mass construction began in the first quarter of the 20th century - is an illustration of the famous thesis about the rivalry of means of attack and defense. Initially, no means of detecting submarines in a submerged position existed at all. In the surface position, the submarines, due to the design features, had very little visibility. These combat qualities, which made the submarine perhaps the most formidable naval weapon of its time, remained until 1941. It was then that radar first appeared on anti-submarine aircraft of British aviation. He confidently detected submarines that were on the surface, and the submarines of that time deserved the name not so much underwater as “diving”, because at least half of the combat campaign had to go “above water”. The boat detected by the radar did not have time to submerge and was almost guaranteed to be destroyed. Almost at the same time - and also by the British - an effective sonar was created, and groups of anti-submarine ships began to confidently localize and destroy submerged submarines. As a result, by the end of the war, the effectiveness of the German submarine fleet was practically reduced to zero.
A hydroacoustic station is used to illuminate the submarine. Sonobuoys and deployed ADS antenna array detect the submarine in multistatic mode. In addition to sonar, the boat can be detected by another three dozen different physical fields and phenomena caused by the actions of the boat. Appropriate sensors track changes in the natural background of the environment, which are caused by the presence of the ship. For example, as a result of the passage of a boat, the water pressure changes, a wave of increased hydrostatic pressure is formed, which can be easily recorded. Seismic sensors can track the vibrations of the seabed caused by the passage of a submarine (the boat exerts pressure on the water, which in turn presses on the seabed). Due to the passage of the boat, the illumination of the underwater bottom, the magnetic field, and the gravitational field of the Earth change. Finally, from the satellite, under certain conditions, you can see the wave wake of the boat, even if it goes deep under water. Modern anti-submarine warfare systems use a whole range of search tools - something should work.
However, with the advent of the nuclear submarine fleet, the ability to detect a submarine on the surface disappeared - the boat no longer surfaced during a combat campaign. And to detect submarines under water by search and strike groups was an extremely troublesome business. This was the impetus for the creation of global underwater lighting systems, primarily hydroacoustic ones. At the same time, passive hydroacoustics, or noise direction finding, has become the main means of detecting submarines, mainly because of its relative cheapness, technological simplicity and the ability to detect targets at long distances. The most impressive DF system is the famous SOSUS system created by the United States during the Cold War. It was a giant field of acoustic antennas spread over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In our near North, they were located throughout the Lofoten Basin - from the coast of Norway to the island of Jan Main. After the deployment of the system, the hidden passage of Soviet submarines to the Atlantic and the Pacific turned out to be practically impossible: submarines were detected at a distance of up to several hundred kilometers.
The submarine (center) is detected by a system consisting of a transmitter towed by a surface ship and numerous receivers: a towed surface ship antenna, a submarine's HAC, sonar buoys, and linear antennas laid out on the ground. The coordinates of each FOSS element at each moment of time are known using a satellite positioning system. The work of the ship formation and FOSS is coordinated using space communications, the AWACS system, from any element of the formation - a submarine or surface ships - means of destroying a detected enemy boat can be used. The situation system is illuminated both from the underwater and surface parts. To illuminate the surface part, spacecraft, AWACS aircraft and surface ships are used. Comprehensive information about the situation in the combat area is concentrated on command posts located on surface ships and on the coast.
Meanwhile, the nuclear submarine was originally a rather noisy structure. The noise level of the first American nuclear submarines of the Nautilus and Seawulf types was about one hundred decibels. Noisy ship mechanisms (engines, pumps, fans, shafts, etc.), noisy propellers, noisy water flowing around the ship ... Noise reduction is the only way to counteract noise direction finding stations and systems like SOSUS. Noise was reduced, however, for other reasons - for example, to reduce the response radius of proximity fuses for mine-torpedo weapons. Designers honed the geometry of propellers, improved the accuracy of manufacturing shafts and machine parts, provided for shock-absorbing mounts that dampen vibration (and hence noise) of mechanisms, and came up with special hull coatings. Since the 1970s, nuclear submarines have been reducing their noise by an average of 1 dB every two years. Only in the last 19 years - from 1990 to the present - the average noise level of US nuclear submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.
Characteristics of the multi-purpose nuclear submarine type "Virginia" (SSN-774)
Length: 115 m // Width: 10 m // Submerged displacement: 7900 tons // Submerged speed: more than 25 knots // Submerged depth: more than 250 m // Crew: 134 // Armament: twelve vertical launchers for Tomahawk cruise missiles, four 533 mm torpedo tubes for Mk48 ADCAP torpedoes and Harpoon missiles, Mk 60 CAPTOR mines To date, the US Navy is armed with five boats of this class - Virginia (SSN-774), Texas (SSN-775), Hawaii (SSN-776), North Carolina (SSN-777) and "New Hampshire" (SSN-778).
To illustrate: since the second half of the 20th century, one of the most effective ways to detect submarines has been the use of nuclear submarines for this purpose, the so-called “hunter boats”. However, in modern times, their search performance has dropped to a completely ridiculous level. According to data published in the open foreign press, the 688I SSN 772 Greenville submarine (built in 1995) detects the Los Angeles type 688 submarine (built in 1978) at a distance of 10 to 35 km. This is a perfectly acceptable result. But the modern "Virginia" (SSN 774, built in 2004) "Greenville" detects at a distance of only 1 to 4 km (according to independent British expert Admiral Palmer). If the boats “see” each other only at such distances, then their very maneuvering next to each other becomes deadly not only for the “victim”, but also for the “hunter”: the risk of an unexpected collision of ships that do not see each other sharply increases.
Types of submarines
Modern boats are of two types - multi-purpose and strategic. Multi-purpose, as their name implies, perform many tasks, including the task of firing at the enemy territory with high-precision weapons - sea-based long-range cruise missiles (KRBDMB). Among other tasks, they can also solve anti-submarine tasks: reconnaissance, deployment of FOSS, laying minefields, etc. Multi-purpose boats today are: in the American fleet, nuclear submarines of the Los Angeles (688I) and Virginia (774) types, as well as converted Ohios (726-729). In the Russian fleet, these include nuclear submarines of the Nizhny Novgorod type (project 945 A), Bars (project 971) and Antey (project 949 A).
Strategic submarines are submarines with ballistic missiles on board, designed to solve strategic deterrence tasks. Boats of this type include the American Ohio and Russian SSBNs of project 667 BDRM, as well as the Dmitry Donskoy (project 941 Shark) and the Yuri Dolgoruky (project 955), which is coming into operation.
(Separately, we note that data on the noise level of Russian submarines and the distance of their detection that are any close to the truth cannot be seen except under the heading "secret".)
Sound pressure is a variable overpressure that occurs in an elastic medium when a sound wave passes through it. The sound pressure level is measured in absolute and relative units. Absolute units are pascals (Pa), one Pa corresponds to a pressure of 1 N/m2. The relative units are decibels (dB), the sound pressure level L in decibels is equal to 20 logarithms of the ratio of the absolute value of the sound pressure P to the threshold sound pressure P0, which is 20 µPa.
A sharp decrease in the detection range of low-noise submarines by noise direction-finding sonar, a revolutionary event from a technological point of view, coincided with revolutionary changes in politics - the collapse of the USSR. By the end of the 20th century, the submarines of the Soviet Union (and Russia) actually ceased to be considered as a military threat to the United States and Western Europe. These two circumstances had far-reaching consequences. The United States has changed its strategy of warfare and, in particular, the use of naval forces. Instead of a global confrontation with the enemy fleet in the sea and ocean, in local wars and armed conflicts, the main task of the Navy has become to deliver strikes from the marginal seas against enemy territory.